MASTER 
NEGATIVE 

NO.  94-82086 


COPYRIGHT  STATEMENT 


The  copyright  law  of  the  United  States  (Title  17,  United  States  Code) 
governs  the  making  of  photocopies  or  other  reproductions  of  copyrighted 
materials  including  foreign  works  under  certain  conditions.  In  addition, 
the  United  States  extends  protection  to  foreign  works  by  means  of 
various  international  conventions,  bilateral  agreements,  and 
proclamations. 

Under  certain  conditions  specified  in  the  law,  libraries  and  archives  are 
authorized  to  furnish  a  photocopy  or  other  reproduction.  One  of  these 
specified  conditions  Is  that  the  photocopy  or  reproduction  is  not  to  be 
"used  for  any  purpose  other  than  private  study,  scholarship,  or  research. 
If  a  user  makes  a  request  for,  or  ater  uses,  a  photocopy  or  reproduction 
for  purposes  in  excess  of  "fair  use,"  that  user  may  be  liable  for  copynght 
Infringement. 

The  Columbia  University  Libraries  reserve  the  right  to  refuse  to  accept  a 
copying  order  if,  in  its  judgement,  fulfillment  of  the  order  would  involve 
violation  of  the  copyright  law. 


Author 


U.S.  President 

(1909-1913:  Taft) 

Title: 

Message  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States... 


Place: 


Washington,  D.C. 

Date: 

1911 


9f  -^:Loi((o-l 


MASTER   NEGATIVE  « 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DIVISION 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


ORIGINAL  MATERIAL  AS  FILMED  •    EXISTING  BIBLIOGRAPHIC  RECORD 


iBUSrNCSS 

f   225 
Un35 


U.  S.    President,  1909-19\Z^  (Taft) 

Message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  com- 
niunicated  to  the  two  houses  of  Congress  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  second  session  Sixty-second  Congress,  De- 
cember 5,  1911,  on  the  anti-trust  statute.  Washington 
[Govt,  print,  off.]  1911. 

43  p.    24i"". 

"Appendix  a.  Suits  brought  and  prosecutions  instituted  by  the  United 
States  under  the  Sherman  antitrust  law" :  p.  19-43. 

1.  Trusts,  Industrial — Law.    2.  Sherman  anti-trust  law,  1890.       i.  Title 

^\  11-35995 


Library  of  Congres 
Qopy2. 


HD2775.A4    1911 


RESTRICTIONS  ON  USE: 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 


FILM  SIZE: 


C^tuf 


REDUCTION  RATIO: 


/^^ 


IMAGE  PLACEMENT:   lA 


DATE  FILMED:  _2i_36J_i_L 


0 


IB      IIB 


INITIALS:   C 


TRACKING  #  : 


M5H  0/0  Vy 


FILMED  BY  PRESERVATION  RESOURCES.  BETHLEHEM.  PA. 


'Jj 


^1^. 


z 

= 

3 

> 

Q) 

CD 

cr 
o  >> 

0,0 

0-2 

^O 

o  m 

?Q  o 

Q-Z! 

=.m 

(D  O 

do^X 

g  ^ 

5  cZ 

hO^:^ 

^^ 

oo^r^ 

^3^ 

cn5  2 

^  o 

^o  o 

^  :::d 

cC/5 

^1 

<  — 1 

^cz 

CTlX 

X  < 

OOM 

N  < 

to 

o 

-< 

ISI 

.'^^ 


a^ 


^^ 


m 

0) 


Oi 

o 

3 

i 


C^ 


K% 


f^ 


<^... 


> 


X^ 


^'^ 


i 


..^^ 


^^ 


^o 


¥cP 


fp 


^Sr 


O 


ffi^^isPISKIsi? 


Uf^  I 


-  is 


c> 


00       b 


to 
ro 


ro 
In 


1.0  mm 


1.5  mm 


2.0  mm 


ABCOEfGHIJKLMNOPORSTUVWXYZ 
abcdefghiiklmnopqrstuvwxyz  1234567890 


ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuwvxyzl234567890 


ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 

abcdefghiiklmnopqrstuvwxyz 

1234567890 


fp 


^Sr 


m 

H 
O 

o 

■o  m  Tj 

OL,"0 

>  C  w 
T  TJ  ^ 

0(0      5 

m 

i! 
o 

m 


jfil'^ 


•«►. 


y^. 


ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz 
2.5  mm  1234567890 


^r^^. 


/^.^^^. 


cr 

I? 

•D  p 

^i 
^1 

"<  30 
OOM 


8 


^^ 


1— • 

NJ 

fNJ 

CJl 

O 

OI 

3 
3 

1 

3 

0» 

cr 


IS 

%^ 

I  o 

xO 
*<  3D 
N  CO 
'-'—I 

<j>x 
oorsi 
o 


/v% 


■  ■'  '-'r^H?'-^'' 


r^.:  ■- 


Ir-,'.'     * 


;\'i.:---  - 


':tr?f '  ^' . 


t:- 


0 


I 


L 


MESSAGE 

OF  THE  PRESIDENT  OF 
THE    UNITED    STATES 


COMMUNICATED  TO  THE  TWO  HOUSES  OF 
CONGRESS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE 
SECOND  SESSION  SIXTY-SECOND  CONGRESS 


DECEMBER  S 
1911 


ON  THE  .  .  . 


ANTI-TRUST 
STATUTE 


WASHINGTON:  1011 


?    ■ 


\::M:^ 


,:-rS  •:-  r  ': 


\ri 


av.351 


LIBRARY 


School  of  Business 


m 


MESSAGE 


OP 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Of 


THE  UNITED  STATES 

COMMUNICATED  TO  THE  TWO 
HOUSES  OF  CONGRESS  AT  THE 
BEGINNING  OF  THE  SECOND 
SESSION  SIXTY- SECOND  CON- 
GRESS  :   :   :  DECEMBER  5,  1911 

ON  THE  ANTI-TRUST  STATUTE 


WASHINGTON 

1911 


(^Lju.--^1-a^J^^ 


liill 


' T\  o\  os.  iC 


1  • 


I" 


MESSAGE. 


To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives: 


j3    This  message  is  the  first  of  several  which  I  shall  send  to  Con- 
'    gress  during  the  interval  between  the  opening  of  its  regular 
ii/l  session  and  its  adjournment  for  the  Christmas  holidays.     The 
^    amount  of  information  to  be  communicated  as  to  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Government,  the  number  of  important  subjects 
calling  for  comment  by  the  Executive,  and  the  transmission 
to  Congress  of  exhaustive  reports  of  special  commissions,  make 
it  impossible  to  include  in  one  message  of  a  reasonable  length 
a  discussion  of  the  topics  that  ought  to  be  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  National  Legislature  at  its  first  regular  session. 

THE   ANTI-TRUST  LAW — THE    SUPREME   COURT   DECISIONS. 

In  May  last  the  Supreme  Court  handed  down  decisions  in  the 
suits  in  equitj'^  brought  by  the  United  States  to  enjoin  the  fur- 
ther maintenance  of  the  Standard  Oil  Trust  and  of  the  American 
Tobacco  Trust,  and  to  secure  their  dissolution.  The  decisions  are 
epoch-making  and  serve  to  advise  the  business  world  authori- 
tatively of  the  scope  and  operation  of  the  anti-trust  act  of  1890. 
The  decisions  do  not  depart  in  any  substantial  way  from  the 
previous  decisions  of  the  court  in  construing  and  applying  this 
important  statute,  but  they  clarify  those  decisions  by  further 
defining  the  already  admitted  exceptions  to  the  literal  construc- 
tion of  the  act.  By  the  decrees,  they  furnish  a  useful  precedent 
as  to  the  proper  method  of  dealing  with  the  capital  and  property 
of  illegal  trusts.  These  decisions  suggest  the  need  and  wisdom 
of  additional  or  supplemental  legislation  to  make  it  easier  for 
the  entire  business  community  to  square  with  the  rule  of  action 
and  legality  thus  finally  established  and  to  preserve  the  benefit, 
freedom,  and  spur  of  reasonable  competition  without  loss  of 
real  efficiency  or  progress. 

(«) 


\ 


NO  CHANGE  IN  THE  RULE  OF  DECISION — MERELY  IN  ITS  FORM  OF 

EXPRESSION. 

The  statute  in  its  first  section  declares  to  be  illegal  "  every 
contract,  combination  in  the  form  of  trust  or  otherwise,  or 
conspiracy,  in  restraint  of  trade  or  commerce  among  the  sev- 
eral States  or  with  foreign  nations,"  and  in  the  second,  declares 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  "  every  person  who  shall  monopolize 
or  attempt  to  monopolize  or  combine  or  conspire  with  any 
other  person  to  monopolize  any  part  of  the  trade  or  commerce 
of  the  several  States  or  with  foreign  nations." 

In  two  early  cases,  where  the  statute  was  invoked  to  enjoin  a 
transportation  rate  agreement  between  interstate  railroad  com- 
panies, it  was  held  that  it  was  no  defense  to  show  that  the  agree- 
ment as  to  rates  complained  of  was  reasonable  at  common  law, 
because  it  was  said  that  the  statute  was  directed  against  all  con- 
tracts and  combinations  in  restraint  of  trade  whether  reason- 
able at  common  law  or  not.  It  was  plain  from  the  record,  how- 
ever, that  the  contracts  complained  of  in  those  cases  would  not 
have  been  deemed  reasonable  at  common  law.  In  subsequent 
cases  the  court  said  that  the  statute  should  be  given  a  reason- 
able construction  and  refused  to  include  within  its  inhibition, 
certain  contractual  restraints  of  trade  which  it  denominated 
as  incidental  or  as  indirect. 

These  cases  of  restraint  of  trade  that  the  court  excepted 
from  the  operation  of  the  statute  were  instances  which,  at 
common  law,  would  have  been  called  reasonable.  In  the  Stand- 
ard Oil  and  Tobacco  cases,  therefore,  the  court  merely  adopted 
the  tests  of  the  common  law,  and  in  defining  exceptions  to  the 
literal  application  of  the  statute,  only  substituted  for  the  test 
of  being  incidental  or  indirect,  that  of  being  reasonable,  and 
this,  without  varying  in  the  slightest  the  actual  scope  and  efifect 
of  the  statute.  In  other  words,  all  the  cases  under  the  statute 
which  have  now  been  decided  would  have  been  decided  the 
same  way  if  the  court  had  originally  accepted  in  its  construc- 
tion the  rule  at  common  law./  ^^  j 

It  has  been  said  that  the  court,  by  introducing  into  the  con- 
struction of  the  statute  common-law  distinctions,  has  emascu- 
lated it.     This  is  obviously  untrue.     By  its  judgment  every 


contract  and  combination  in  restraint  of  interstate  trade  made 
with  the  purpose  or  necessary  effect  of  controlling  prices  by 
stifling  competition,  or  of  establishing  in  whole  or  in  part  a 
monopoly  of  such  trade,  is  condemned  by  the  statute.  The 
most  extreme  critics  can  not  instance  a  case  that  ought  to  be 
condemned  under  the  statute  which  is  not  brought  within  its 
terjns  as  thus  construed. 
6^ /The  suggestion  is  also  made  that  the  Supreme  Court  by  its 
decision  in  the  last  two  cases  has  committed  to  the  court  the 
undefined  and  unlimited  discretion  to  determine  whether  a 
case  of  restraint  of  trade  is  within  the  terms  of  the  statute. 
This  is  wholly  untrue.  A  reasonable  restraint  of  trade  at  com- 
mon law  is  well  understood  and  is  clearly  defined.  It  does  not 
rest  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.  It  must  be  limited  to  accom- 
plish the  purpose  of  a  lawful  main  contract  to  which,  in  order 
that  it  shall  be  enforceable  at  all,  it  must  be  incidental.  If  it 
exceed  the  needs  of  that  contract,  it  is  void^  r 

The  test  of  reasonableness  was  never  applied  by  the  court  at 
common  law  to  contracts  or  combinations  or  conspiracies  in 
restraint  of  trade  whose  purpose  was  or  whose  necessary  effect 
would  be  to  stifle  competition,  to  control  prices,  or  establish 
monopolies.  The  courts  never  assumed  power  to  say  that  such 
contracts  or  combinations  or  conspiracies  might  be  lawful  if 
the  parties  to  them  were  only  moderate  in  the  use  of  the  power 
thus  secured  and  did  not  exact  from  the  public  too  great  and 
exorbitant  prices.  It  is  true  that  many  theorists,  and  others 
engaged  in  business  violating  the  statute,  have  hoped  that  some 
such  line  could  be  drawn  by  courts;  but  no  court  of  authority 
has  ever  attempted  it.  Certainly  there  is  nothing  in  the  deci- 
sions of  the  latest  two  cases  from  which  such  a  dangerous 
theory  of  judicial  discretion  in  enforcing  this  statute  can  derive 
the  slightest  sanction. 

FORCE  AND  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  STATUTE  A  MATTER  OF  GROWTH, 

We  have  been  twenty-one  years  making  this  statute  effective 
for  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  enacted  The  Knight  case 
was  discouraging  and  seemed  to  remit  to  the  States  the  whole 
available  power  to  attack  and  suppress  the  evils  of  the  trusts. 
Slowly,  however,  the  error  of  that  judgment  was  corrected,  and 


only  in  the  last  three  or  four  years  has  the  heavy  hand  of  the 
law  been  laid  upon  the  great  illegal  combinations  that  have 
exercised  such  an  absolute  dominion  over  many  of  our  indus- 
tries. Criminal  prosecutions  have  been  brought  and  a  number 
are  pending,  but  juries  have  felt  averse  to  convicting  for  jail 
sentences,  and  judges  have  been  most  reluctant  to  impose  such 
sentences  on  men  of  respectable  standing  in  society  whose 
offense  has  been  regarded  as  merely  statutory.  Still,  as  the 
offense  becomes  better  understood  and  the  committing  of  it 
partakes  more  of  studied  and  deliberate  defiance  of  the  law, 
we  can  be  confident  that  juries  will  convict  individuals  and  that 
jail  sentences  will  be  imposed. 

THE  REMEDY  IN  EQUITY  BY  DISSOLUTION. 

In  the  Standard  Oil  case  the  Supreme  and  Circuit  Courts 
found  the  combination  to  be  a  monopoly  of  the  interstate  busi- 
ness of  refining,  transporting,  and  marketing  petroleum  and  its 
products,  effected  and  maintained  through  thirty-seven  different 
corporations,  the  stock  of  which  was  held  by  a  New  Jersey  com- 
pany. It  in  eflFect  commanded  the  dissolution  of  this  combina- 
tion, directed  the  transfer  and  pro  rata  distribution  by  the 
New  Jersey  company  of  the  stock  held  by  it  in  the  thirty-seven 
corporations  to  and  among  its  stockholders;  and  the  corpora- 
tions and  individual  defendants  were  enjoined  from  conspiring 
or  combining  to  restore  such  monopoly;  and  all  agreements  be- 
tween the  subsidiary  corporations  tending  to  produce  or  bring 
about  further  violations  of  the  act  were  enjoined. 

In  the  Tobacco  case,  the  court  found  that  the  individual 
defendants,  twenty-nine  in  number,  had  been  engaged  in  a 
successful  effort  to  acquire  complete  dominion  over  the  manu- 
facture, sale,  and  distribution  of  tobacco  in  this  country  and 
abroad,  and  that  this  had  been  done  by  combinations  made 
with  a  purpose  and  effect  to  stifle  competition,  control  prices, 
and  establish  a  monopoly,  not  only  in  the  manufacture  of 
tobacco,  but  also  of  tin-foil  and  licorice  used  in  its  manufac- 
ture and  of  its  products  of  cigars,  cigarettes,  and  snuffs.  The 
tobacco  suit  presented  a  far  more  complicated  and  difficult 
case  than  the  Standard  Oil  suit  for  a  decree  which  would 


effectuate  the  will  of  the  court  and  end  the  violation  of  the 
statute.  There  was  here  no  single  holding  company  as  in  the 
case  of  the  Standard  Oil  Trust.  The  main  company  was  the 
American  Tobacco  Company,  a  manufacturing,  selling,  and 
holding  company.  The  plan  adopted  to  destroy  the  combina- 
tion and  restore  competition  involved  the  redivision  of  the 
capital  and  plants  of  the  whole  trust  between  some  of  the  com- 
panies constituting  the  trust  and  new  companies  organized  for 
the  purposes  of  the  decree  and  made  parties  to  it,  and  number- 
ing, new  and  old,  fourteen. 

SITUATION  AFTER  READJUSTMENT. 

The  American  Tobacco  Company  (old),  readjusted  capital, 
$92,000,000;  the  Liggett  &  Meyers  Tobacco  Company  (new),  cap- 
ital, $67,000,000;  the  P.  LoriUard  Company  (new),  capital, 
$47,000,000;  and  the  R.  J.  Reynolds  Tobacco  Company  (old), 
capital,  $7,525,000,  are  chiefly  engaged  in  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  chewing  and  smoking  tobacco  and  cigars.  The  former 
one  tin-foil  company  is  divided  into  two,  one  of  $825,000  capital 
and  the  other  of  $400,000.  The  one  snuff  company  is  divided 
into  three  companies,  one  with  a  capital  of  $15,000,000,  another 
with  a  capital  of  $8,000,000,  and  a  third  with  a  capital  of 
$8,000,000.  The  licorice  companies  are  two,  one  with  a  capital 
of  $5,758,300  and  another  with  a  capital  of  $2,000,000.  There 
is,  also,  the  British-American  Tobacco  Company,  a  British  cor- 
poration, doing  business  abroad  with  a  capital  of  $26,000,000, 
the  Porto  Rican  Tobacco  Company,  with  a  capital  of  $1,800,000, 
and  the  corporation  of  United  Cigar  Stores,  with  a  capital  of 
$9,000,000. 

Under  this  arrangement,  each  of  the  different  kinds  of  busi- 
ness will  be  distributed  between  two  or  more  companies  with 
a  division  of  the  prominent  brands  in  the  same  tobacco  prod- 
ucts, so  as  to  make  competition  not  only  possible  but  necessary. 
Thus  the  smoking-tobacco  business  of  the  country  is  divided 
so  that  the  present  independent  companies  have  21.39  per  cent, 
while  the  American  Tobacco  Company  will  have  33.08  per  cent, 
the  Liggett  &  Meyers  20.05  per  cent,  the  Lorillard  Company 
22.82  per  cent,  and  the  Reynolds  Company  2.66  per  cent.    The 

17808—11 2 


8 

stock  of  the  other  thirteen  companies,  both  preferred  and  com- 
mon, has  been  taken  from  the  defendant  American  Tobacco 
Company  and  has  been  distributed  among  its  stockholders.  All 
covenants  restricting  competition  have  been  declared  null  and 
further  performance  of  them  has  been  enjoined.  The  pre- 
ferred stock  of  the  different  companies  has  now  been  given 
voting  power  which  was  denied  it  under  the  old  organization. 
The  ratio  of  the  preferred  stock  to  the  common  was  as  78  to 
40.  This  constitutes  a  very  decided  change  in  the  character 
of  the  ownership  and  control  of  each  company. 

In  the  original  suit  there  were  twenty-nine  defendants  who 
were  charged  with  being  the  conspirators  through  whom  the 
illegal  combination  acquired  and  exercised  its  unlawful  do- 
minion. Under  the  decree  these  defendants  will  hold  amounts 
of  stock  in  the  various  distributee  companies  ranging  from  41 
per  cent  as  a  maximum  to  28J  per  cent  as  a  minimum,  except 
in  the  case  of  one  small  company,  the  Porto  Rican  Tobacco 
Company,  in  which  they  will  hold  45  per  cent.  The  twenty-nine 
individual  defendants  are  enjoined  for  three  years  from  buying 
any  stock  except  from  each  other,  and  the  group  is  thus  pre- 
vented from  extending  its  control  during  that  period.  All  par- 
ties to  the  suit,  and  the  new  companies  who  are  made  parties, 
are  enjoined  perpetually  from  in  any  way  effecting  any  com- 
bination between  any  of  the  companies  in  violation  of  the 
statute  by  way  of  resumption  of  the  old  trust.  Each  of  the 
fourteen  companies  is  enjoined  from  acquiring  stock  in  any 
of  the  others.  All  these  companies  are  enjoined  from  having 
common  directors  or  officers,  or  common  buying  or  selling 
agents,  or  common  offices,  or  lending  money  to  each  other. 

SIZE  OF  NEW  COMPANIES. 

Objection  was  made  by  certain  independent  tobacco  com- 
panies that  this  settlement  was  unjust  because  it  left  companies 
with  very  large  capital  in  active  business,  and  that  the  settle- 
ment that  would  be  effective  to  put  all  on  an  equality  would 
be  a  division  of  the  capital  and  plant  of  the  trust  into  small 
fractions  in  amount  more  nearly  equal  to  that  of  each  of  the 
independent  companies.    This  contention  results  from  a  mis- 


9 

understanding  of  the  anti-trust  law  and  its  purpose.  It  is  not 
intended  thereby  to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  large  capital 
in  business  enterprises  in  which  such  a  combination  can  secure 
reduced  cost  of  production,  sale,  and  distribution.  It  is  directed 
against  such  an  aggregation  of  capital  only  when  its  purpose 
is  that  of  stifling  competition,  enhancing  or  controlling  prices, 
and  establishing  a  monopoly.  If  we  shall  have  by  the  decree 
defeated  these  purposes  and  restored  competition  between  the 
large  units  into  which  the  capital  and  plant  have  been  divided, 
we  shall  have  accomplished  the  useful  purpose  of  the  statute. 

CONFISCATION    NOT   THE   PURPOSE    OF   THE    STATUTE. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  statute  to  confiscate  the  property 
and  capital  of  the  offending  trusts.  Methods  of  punishment 
by  fine  or  imprisonment  of  the  individual  offenders,  by  fine  of 
the  corporation  or  by  forfeiture  of  its  goods  in  transportation, 
are  provided,  but  the  proceeding  in  equity  is  a  specific  remedy 
to  stop  the  operation  of  the  trust  by  injunction  and  prevent  the 
future  use  of  the  plant  and  capital  in  violation  of  the  statute. 

EFFECTIVENESS   OF  DECREE. 

I  venture  to  say  that  not  in  the  history  of  American  law  has 
a  decree  more  effective  for  such  a  purpose  been  entered  by  a 
court  than  that  against  the  Tobacco  Trust.  As  Circuit  Judge 
Noyes  said  in  his  judgment  approving  the  decree: 

"The  extent  to  which  it  has  been  necessary  to  tear  apart  this 
combination  and  force  it  into  new  forms  with  the  attendant 
burdens  ought  to  demonstrate  that  the  Federal  anti-trust  statute 
is  a  drastic  statute  which  accomplishes  effective  results;  which 
so  long  as  it  stands  on  the  statute  books  must  be  obeyed,  and 
which  can  not  be  disobeyed  without  incurring  far-reaching 
penalties.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  successful  reconstruc- 
tion of  this  organization  should  teach  that  the  effect  of  enforc- 
ing this  statute  is  not  to  destroy,  but  to  reconstruct;  not  to 
demolish,  but  to  re-create  in  accordance  with  the  conditions 
which  the  Congress  has  declared  shall  exist  among  the  people 
of  the  United  States." 


10 


COMMON-STOCK  OWNERSHIP. 


It  has  been  assumed  that  the  present  pro  rata  and  common 
ownership  in  all  these  companies  by  former  stockholders  of 
the  trust  would  insure  a  continuance  of  the  same  old  single 
control  of  all  the  companies  into  which  the  trust  has  by  decree 
been  disintegrated.    This  is  erroneous  and  is  based  upon  the 
assumed  inefficacy  and  innocuousness  of  judicial  injunctions. 
The  companies  are  enjoined  from  cooperation  or  combination; 
they  have  different  managers,  directors,  purchasing  and  sales 
agents.    If  all  or  many  of  the  numerous  stockholders,  reaching 
into  the  thousands,  attempt  to  secure  concerted  action  of  the 
companies  with  a  view  to  the  control  of  the  market,  their  num- 
ber is  so  large  that  such  an  attempt  could  not  well  be  concealed, 
and  its  prime  movers  and  all  its  participants  would  be  at  once 
subject  to  contempt  proceedings  and  imprisonment  of  a  sum- 
mary character.    The  immediate  result  of  the  present  situation 
will  necessarily  be  activity  by  all  the  companies  under  different 
managers,  and  then  competition  must  follow,  or  there  will  be 
activity  by  one  company  and  stagnation  by  another.     Only  a 
short  time  will  inevitably  lead  to  a  change  in  ownership  of  the 
stock,  as  all  opportunity  for  continued  cooperation  must  dis- 
appear.   Those  critics  who  speak  of  this  disintegration  in  the 
trust  as  a  mere  change  of  garments  have  not  given  considera- 
tion to  the  inevitable  working  of  the  decree  and  understand 
little  the  personal  danger  of  attempting  to  evade  or  set  at 
naught  the  solemn  injunction  of  a  court  whose  object  is  made 
plain  by  the  decree  and  whose  inhibitions  are  set  forth  with  a 
detail  and  comprehensiveness  unexampled  in  the  history  of 
equity  jurisprudence. 

VOLUNTARY   REORGANIZATIONS   OF  OTHER  TRUSTS   AT   HAND. 

The  effect  of  these  two  decisions  has  led  to  decrees  dissolving 
the  combination  of  manufacturers  of  electric  lamps,  a  southern 
wholesale  grocers'  association,  an  interlocutory  decree  against 
the  Powder  Trust  with  directions  by  the  circuit  court  com- 
pelling dissolution,  and  other  combinations  of  a  similar  history 
are  now  negotiating  with  the  Department  of  Justice  looking  to 


11 

a  disintegration  by  decree  and  reorganization  in  accordance 
with  law.  It  seems  possible  to  bring  about  these  reorganiza- 
tions without  general  business  disturbance. 

MOVEMENT  FOR  REPEAL  OF  THE  ANTI-TRUST  LAW. 

But  now  that  the  anti-trust  act  is  seen  to  be  effective  for  the 
accomplishment  of  the  purpose  of  its  enactment,  we  are  met 
by  a  cry  from  many  different  quarters  for  its  repeal.  It  is 
said  to  be  obstructive  of  business  progress,  to  be  an  attempt  to 
restore  old-fashioned  methods  of  destructive  competition  be- 
tween small  units,  and  to  make  impossible  those  useful  combi- 
nations of  capital  and  the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  production 
that  are  essential  to  continued  prosperity  and  normal  growth. 

In  the  recent  decisions  the  Supreme  Court  makes  clear  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  statute  which  condemns  combinations 
of  capital  or  mere  bigness  of  plant  organized  to  secure  economy 
in  production  and  a  reduction  of  its  cost.  It  is  only  when  the 
purpose  or  necessary  effect  of  the  organization  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  combination  or  the  aggregation  of  immense  size 
are  the  stifling  of  competition,  actual  and  potential,  and  the 
enhancing  of  prices  and  establishing  a  monopoly,  that  the  stat- 
ute is  violated.  Mere  size  is  no  sin  against  the  law.  The  merg- 
ing of  two  or  more  business  plants  necessarily  eliminates  com- 
petition between  the  units  thus  combined,  but  this  elimination 
is  in  contravention  of  the  statute  only  when  the  combination  is 
made  for  purpose  of  ending  this  particular  competition  in  order 
to  secure  control  of,  and  enhance,  prices  and  create  a  monopoly. 

LACK  OF  DEFINITENESS   IN  THE   STATUTE. 

The  complaint  is  made  of  the  statute  that  it  is  not  sufficiently 
definite  in  its  description  of  that  which  is  forbidden,  to  enable 
business  men  to  avoid  its  violation.  The  suggestion  is,  that 
we  may  have  a  combination  of  two  corporations,  which  may  run 
on  for  years,  and  that  subsequently  the  Attorney  General  may 
conclude  that  it  was  a  violation  of  the  statute,  and  that  which 
was  supposed  by  the  combiners  to  be  innocent  then  turns  out 
to  be  a  combination  in  violation  of  the  statute.  The  answer  to 
this  hypothetical  case  is  that  when  men  attempt  to  amass 


12 

such  stupendous  capital  as  will  enable  them  to  suppress  com- 
petition, control  prices  and  establish  a  monopoly,  they  know 
the  purpose  of  their  acts.  Men  do  not  do  such  a  thing  without 
having  it  clearly  in  mind.  If  what  they  do  is  merely  for  the 
purpose  of  reducing  the  cost  of  production,  without  the  thought 
of  suppressing  competition  by  use  of  the  bigness  of  the  plant 
they  are  creating,  then  they  can  not  be  convicted  at  the  time 
the  union  is  made,  nor  can  they  be  convicted  later,  unless  it 
happen  that  later  on  they  conclude  to  suppress  competition 
and  take  the  usual  methods  for  doing  so,  and  thus  establish  for 
themselves  a  monopoly.  They  can,  in  such  a  case,  hardly 
complain  if  the  motive  which  subsequently  is  disclosed  is  at- 
tributed by  the  court  to  the  original  combination. 

NEW    REMEDIES    SUGGESTED. 

Much  is  said  of  the  repeal  of  this  statute  and  of  constructive 
legislation  intended  to  accomplish  the  purpose  and  blaze  a 
clear  path  for  honest  merchants  and  business  men  to  follow. 
It  may  be  that  such  a  plan  will  be  evolved,  but  I  submit  that 
the  discussions  which  have  been  brought  out  in  recent  days  by 
the  fear  of  the  continued  execution  of  the  anti-trust  law  have 
produced  nothing  but  glittering  generalities  and  have  offered 
no  line  of  distinction  or  rule  of  action  as  definite  and  as  clear  as 
that  which  the  Supreme  Court  itself  lays  down  in  enforcing  the 
statute. 

SUPPLEMENTAL  LEGISLATION   NEEDED — ^NOT  REPEAL   OR   AMENDMENT. 

I  see  no  objection — and  indeed  I  can  see  decided  advan- 
tages— in  the  enactment  of  a  law  which  shall  describe  and 
denounce  methods  of  competition  which  are  unfair  and  are 
badges  of  the  unlawful  purpose  denounced  in  the  anti-trust  law. 
The  attempt  and  purpose  to  suppress  a  competitor  by  under- 
selling him  at  a  price  so  unprofitable  as  to  drive  him  out  of 
business,  or  the  making  of  exclusive  contracts  with  customers 
under  which  they  are  required  to  give  up  association  with  other 
manufacturers,  and  numerous  kindred  methods  for  stifling 
competition  and  efiFecting  monopoly,  should  be  described  with 
sufficient  accuracy  in  a  criminal  statute  on  the  one  hand  to 
enable  the  Government  to  shorten  its  task  by  prosecuting  single 


13 

misdemeanors  instead  of  an  entire  conspiracy,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  serve  the  purpose  of  pointing  out  more  in  detail 
to  the  business  community  what  must  be  avoided. 

FEDERAL    INCORPORATION    RECOMMENDED. 

In  a  special  message  to  Congress  on  January  7,  1910,  I  ven- 
tured to  point  out  the  disturbance  to  business  that  would 
probably  attend  the  dissolution  of  these  offending  trusts.  I 
said: 

"But  such  an  investigation  and  possible  prosecution  of 
corporations  whose  prosperity  or  destruction  affects  the  com- 
fort not  only  of  stockholders  but  of  millions  of  wage  earners, 
employees,  and  associated  tradesmen  must  necessarily  tend  to 
disturb  the  confidence  of  the  business  community,  to  dry  up 
the  now  flowing  sources  of  capital  from  its  places  of  hoarding, 
and  produce  a  halt  in  our  present  prosperity  that  will  cause 
suffering  and  strained  circumstances  among  the  innocent  many 
for  the  faults  of  the  guilty  few.  The  question  which  I  wish  in 
this  message  to  bring  clearly  to  the  consideration  and  discus- 
sion of  Congress  is  whether,  in  order  to  avoid  such  a  possible 
business  danger,  something  can  not  be  done  by  which  these 
business  combinations  may  be  offered  a  means,  without  great 
financial  disturbance,  of  changing  the  character,  organization, 
and  extent  of  their  business  into  one  within  the  lines  of  the 
law  under  Federal  control  and  supervision,  securing  compli- 
ance with  the  anti-trust  statute. 

•*  Generally,  in  the  industrial  combinations  called  *  trusts,' 
the  principal  business  is  the  sale  of  goods  in  many  States  and 
in  foreign  markets;  in  other  words,  the  interstate  and  foreign 
business  far  exceeds  the  business  done  in  any  one  State.  This 
fact  will  justify  the  Federal  Government  in  granting  a  Federal 
charter  to  such  a  combination  to  make  and  sell  in  interstate 
and  foreign  commerce  the  products  of  useful  manufacture 
under  such  limitations  as  will  secure  a  compliance  with  the 
anti-trust  law.  It  is  possible  so  to  frame  a  statute  that  while 
it  offers  protection  to  a  Federal  company  against  harmful, 
vexatious,  and  unnecessary  invasion  by  the  States,  it  shall  sub- 
ject it  to  reasonable  taxation  and  control  by  the  States  with 
respect  to  its  purely  local  business.     ♦     *     * 


H 


Jnt 

••  Corporations  organized  under  this  act  should  be  prohibited 
from  acquiring  and  holding  stock  in  other  corporations  (except 
for  special  reasons,  upon  approval  by  the  proper  Federal  au- 
thority), thus  avoiding  the  creation  under  national  auspices  of 
the  holding  company  with  subordinate  corporations  in  differ- 
ent States,  which  has  been  such  an  effective  agency  in  the 
I  creation  of  the  great  trusts  and  monopolies. 

"  If  the  prohibition  of  the  anti-trust  act  against  combinations 
in  restraint  of  trade  is  to  be  effectively  enforced,  it  is  essential 
that  the  National  Government  shall  provide  for  the  creation  of 
national  corporations  to  carry  on  a  legitimate  business  through- 
out the  United  States.  The  conflicting  laws  of  the  different 
States  of  the  Union  with  respect  to  foreign  corporations  make 
it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  one  corporation  to  comply 
with  their  requirements  so  as  to  carry  on  business  in  a  number 
of  different  States." 

I  renew  the  recommendation  of  the  enactment  of  a  general 
law  providing  for  the  voluntary  formation  of  corporations  to 
engage  in  trade  and  commerce  among  the  States  and  with 
foreign  nations.  Every  argument  which  was  then  advanced 
for  such  a  law,  and  every  explanation  which  was  at  that  time 
offered  to  possible  objections,  have  been  confirmed  by  our 
experience  since  the  enforcement  of  the  anti-trust  statute 
has  resulted  in  the  actual  dissolution  of  active  commercial 
organizations. 

It  is  even  more  manifest  now  than  it  was  then  that  the  de- 
nunciation of  conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade  should  not  and 
does  not  mean  the  denial  of  organizations  large  enough  to  be 
intrusted  with  our  interstate  and  foreign  trade.  It  has  been 
made  more  clear  now  than  it  was  then  that  a  purely  negative 
statute  like  the  anti-trust  law  may  well  be  supplemented  by 
specific  provisions  for  the  building  up  and  regulation  of  legiti- 
mate national  and  foreign  commerce, 

GOVERNMENT    ADMINISTRATIVE    EXPERTS    NEEDED    TO    AID    COURTS    IN 

TRUST  DISSOLUTIONS. 

The  drafting  of  the  decrees  in  the  dissolution  of  the  present 
trusts,  with  a  view  to  their  reorganization  into  legitimate  cor- 
porations, has  made  it  especially  apparent  that  the  courts  are 


15 

not  provided  with  the  administrative  machinery  to  make  the 
necessary  inquiries  preparatory  to  reorganization,  or  to  pursue 
such  inquiries,  and  they  should  be  empowered  to  invoke  the  aid 
of  the  Bureau  of  Corporations  in  determining  the  suitable  reor- 
ganization of  the  disintegrated  parts.  The  circuit  court  and  the 
Attorney  General  were  greatly  aided  in  framing  the  decree  in 
the  Tobacco  Trust  dissolution  by  an  expert  from  the  Bureau  of 
Corporations. 

FEDERAL    CORPORATION    COMMISSION    PROPOSED. 

I  do  not  set  forth  in  detail  the  terms  and  sections  of  a  statute 
which  might  supply  the  constructive  legislation  permitting  and 
aiding  the  formation  of  combinations  of  capital  into  Federal 
corporations.  They  should  be  subject  to  rigid  rule§  as  to  their 
organization  and  procedure,  including  effective  publicity^  and 
to  the  closest  supervision  as  to  the  issue  of  stock  and  bonds 
by  an  executive  bureau  or  commission  in  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor,  to  which  in  times  of  doubt  they  might 
well  submit  their  proposed  plans  for  future  business.  It  must 
be  distinctly  understood  that  incorporation  under  a  Federal 
law  could  not  exempt  the  company  thus  formed  and  its  incor- 
porators and  managers  from  prosecution  under  the  anti-trust 
law  for  subsequent  illegal  conduct,  but  the  publicity  of  its  pro- 
cedure and  the  opportunity  for  frequent  consultation  with  the 
bureau  or  commission  in  charge  of  the  incorporation  as  to 
the  legitimate  purpose  of  its  transactions  would  offer  it  as  great 
security  against  successful  prosecutions  for  violations  of  the  law 
as  would  be  practical  or  wise. 

Such  a  bureau  or  commission  might  well  be  invested  also 
with  the  duty  already  referred  to,  of  aiding  courts  in  the  disso- 
lution and  re-creation  of  trusts  within  the  law.  It  should  be 
an  executive  tribunal  of  the  dignity  and  power  of  the  Comp- 
troller of  the  Currency  or  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, which  now  exercise  supervisory  power  over  important 
classes  of  corporations  under  Federal  regulation. 

The  drafting  of  such  a  Federal  incorporation  law  would  offer 
ample  opportunity  to  prevent  many  manifest  evils  in  corporate 


17808—11- 


16 

management  to-day,  including  irresponsibility  of  control  in  the 
hands  of  the  few  who  are  not  the  real  owners. 

INCORPORATION   VOLUNTARY. 

I  recommend  that  the  Federal  charters  thus  to  be  granted 
shall  be  voluntary,  at  least  until  experience  justifies  mandatory 
provisions.  The  benefit  to  be  derived  from  the  operation  of 
great  businesses  under  the  protection  of  such  a  charter  would 
attract  all  who  are  anxious  to  keep  within  the  lines  of  the  law. 
Other  large  combinations  that  fail  to  take  advantage  of  the 
Federal  incorporation  will  not  have  a  right  to  complain  if  their 
failure  is  ascribed  to  unwillingness  to  submit  their  transactions 
to  the  careful  official  scrutiny,  competent  supervision,  and  pub- 
licity attendant  upon  the  enjoyment  of  such  a  charter. 

ONLY   SUPPLEMENTAL  LEGISLATION   NEEDED. 

The  opportunity  thus  suggested  for  Federal  incorporation,  it 
seems  to  me,  is  suitable  constructive  legislation  needed  to  facili- 
tate the  squaring  of  great  industrial  enterprises  to  the  rule  of 
action  laid  down  by  the  anti-trust  law.  This  statute  as  con- 
strued by  the  Supreme  Court  must  continue  to  be  the  Ime  of 
distinction  for  legiUmate  business.  It  must  be  enforced,  unless 
we  are  to  banish  individualism  from  all  business  and  reduce  it 
to  one  common  system  of  regulation  or  control  of  prices  like 
that  which  now  prevails  with  respect  to  public  utilities,  and 
which  when  applied  to  all  business  would  be  a  long  step  toward 
State  socialism. 

IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  ANTI-TRUST  ACT. 

The  anti-trust  act  is  the  expression  of  the  effort  of  a  freedom- 
'  loving  people  to  preserve  equality  of  opportunity.  It  is  the 
result  of  the  confident  determination  of  such  a  people  to  main- 
tain their  future  growth  by  preserving  uncontroUed  and  un- 
restricted the  enterprise  of  the  individual,  his  industry,  his 
ingenuity,  his  intelligence,  and  his  independent  courage. 

For  twenty  years  or  more  this  statute  has  been  upon  the 
statute  book.  All  knew  its  general  purpose  and  approved. 
Many  of  its  violators  were  cynical  over  its  assumed  impotence. 


17 

It  seemed  impossible  of  enforcement.  Slowly  the  mills  of  the 
courts  ground,  and  only  gradually  did  the  majesty  of  the  law 
assert  itself.  Many  of  its  statesmen-authors  died  before  it  be- 
came a  living  force,  and  they  and  others  saw  the  evil  grow 
which  they  had  hoped  to  destroy.  Now  its  efficacy  is  seen;  now 
its  power  is  heavy;  now  its  object  is  near  achievement  Now 
we  hear  the  call  for  its  repeal  on  the  plea  that  it  interferes  with 
business  prosperity,  and  we  are  advised  in  most  general  terms, 
how  by  some  other  statute  and  in  some  other  way  the  evil  we 
are  just  stamping  out  can  be  cured,  if  we  only  abandon  this 
work  of  twenty  years  and  try  another  experiment  for  another 
term  of  years. 

It  is  said  that  the  act  has  not  done  good.  Can  this  be  said 
in  the  face  of  the  effect  of  the  Northern  Securities  decree? 
That  decree  was  in  no  way  so  drastic  or  inhibitive  in  detail 
as  either  the  Standard  Oil  decree  or  the  Tobacco  decree;  but 
did  it  not  stop  for  all  time  the  then  powerful  movement  toward 
the  control  of  all  the  railroads  of  the  country  in  a  single  hand? 
Such  a  one-man  power  could  not  have  been  a  healthful  influ- 
ence in  the  Republic,  even  though  exercised  under  the  general 
super\'ision  of  an  interstate  commission. 

Do  we  desire  to  make  such  ruthless  combinations  and  mo- 
nopolies lawful?  When  all  energies  are  directed,  not  toward 
the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  production  for  the  public  benefit  by 
a  healthful  competition,  but  toward  new  ways  and  means  for 
making  permanent  in  a  few  hands  the  absolute  control  of  the 
conditions  and  prices  prevailing  in  the  whole  field  of  industry, 
then  individual  enterprise  and  effort  will  be  paralyzed  and  the 
spirit  of  commercial  freedom  will  be  dead. 

Wm.  H.  Taft. 
The  WnrrE  House,  December  5,  iOll. 


w 


kr 


APPENDIX  A. 

SufTS  Brought  and  Prosecutions  Instituted  by  the  United 
States  Under  the  Sherman  Antitrust  Law. 

President  Harbison's  Administration,  March  4,  1889,  to  March  4,  1893. 


1. 


2. 


[William  H.  H.  Miller,  Attorney  General,  March  5,  1889,  to  March  6,  1893.] 

United  States  v.  Jellico  Mountain  Coal  Company,  43  Fed. 
Rep.,  898;  46  Fed.  Rep.,  432. 

(Circuit  Court,  M.  D.  Tennessee.  October  13,  1890;  June 
4,  1891.) 

Suit  against  the  members  of  the  "  Nashville  Coal  Ex- 
change," composed  of  various  coal-mining  companies  oper- 
ating mines  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  of  persons  and 
firms  dealing  in  coal  in  Nashville,  formed  for  the  purpose 
of  fixing  prices  and  regulating  the  output  of  coal. 

A  preliminary  injunction  was  denied  on  October  13, 1890. 
Upon  full  hearing  the  court,  on  June  4,  1891,  held  the  com- 
bination to  be  in  violation  of  the  antitrust  law  and  enjoined 
the  further  carrying  out  of  the  agreement. 

United  States  v.  Greenhut  et  al.,  50  Fed.  Rep.,  469. 
(District  Court,  Massachusetts.    May  16,  1892.) 
A  proceeding  by  indictment  against  the  officers  of  the 
Distilling  and  Cattle  Feeding  Co.  (Whisky  Trust)  for  an 
alleged  violation  of  the  antitrust  law. 

Indictment  quashed,  as  allegations  were  held  not  to  con- 
stitute an  offense  under  the  statute. 


2a. 


In  re  Corning,  51  Fed.  Rep.,  205. 

(District  Court,  N.  D.  Ohio.    June  11, 1892.) 
Application  for  a  warrant  of  removal  from  Ohio  to  Mas- 
sachusetts to  answer  to  the  indictment  found  in  the  Green- 
hut  case.    Application  denied  and  prisoner  discharged. 


2b. 


In  re  Terrell,  51  Fed.  Rep.,  213. 

(Circuit  Court,  S.  D.  New  York.    June  28, 1892.) 
Application  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  secure  a  dis- 
charge from  arrest  and  detention  upon  a  warrant  for  re- 
moval from  New  York  to  Massachusetts  to  answer  to  the 
indictment  found  in  the  Greenhut  case. 
Petitioner  discharged. 

[19] 


"Hp^J 


20 


2c. 


3. 


4 


In  re  Greene,  52  Fed.  Rep.,  104. 

(Circuit  Court,  S.  D.  Ohio.    August  4, 1892.) 
Petition  for  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  secure  release  from 
the  custody  of  the  marshal,  by  whom  he  was  held  awaiting 
an  order  for  the  removal  of  Greene  to  Massachusetts  to  an- 
swer to  the  indictment  in  the  Greenhut  case. 
Prisoner  discharged. 

United  States  v.  Nelson,  52  Fed.  Rep.,  646. 

(District  Court,  Minnesota.    October  10, 1892.) 
Indictment  of  a  number  of  lumber  dealers  for  conspiring 
together  to  raise  the  price  of  lumber  in  violation  of  the  anti- 
trust law. 

Demurrer  to  indictment  sustained,  the  court  holding  that 
an  agreement  between  a  number  of  dealers  to  raise  prices, 
unless  they  controlled  nearly  the  entire  commodity,  could 
not  operate  as  a  restraint  of  trade  under  the  act. 

United  States  v.  Trans-Missouri  Freight  Association,  53  Fed. 
Rep.,  440;  58  Fed.  Rep.,  58;  166  U.  S.,  290. 

(Circuit  Court,  Kansas.    November  28,  1892.) 

(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Eighth  Circuit.     October  2, 

1893.) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  March  22, 1897.) 
Bill  filed  January  6,  1892,  to  enjoin  the  operations  of  a 
combination  of  railroads  engaged  in  interstate  commerce, 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  "  just  and  reason- 
able rates,"  etc.  Bill  dismissed  by  Circuit  Court;  decree 
of  dismissal  affirmed  by  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  and  re- 
versed by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  March  22, 
1897. 


21 


5. 


United  States  v.  Worldngmen's  Amalgamated  Council  of  New 
Orleans  et  a/.,  54  Fed.  Rep.,  994;  57  Fed.  Rep.,  85. 
(Circuit  Court,  E.  D.  Louisiana.    March  25, 1893.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Fifth  Circuit.    June  13, 1893.)  i 
Suit  to  restrain  defendants,  a  combination  of  workmen, 
from  interfering  with  interstate  and  f oreign-  commerce,  in  | 
violation  of  the  antitrust  law.    The  injunction  was  granted! 
and  the  law  held  to  apply  to  combinations  of  laborers  as 
well  as  capitalists. 
This  decree  was  affirmed  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals. 


6. 


7. 


United  States  v.  Patterson  et  a/.,  55  Fed.  Rep.,  605;  59  Fed. 
Rep.,  280. 

(Circuit  Court,  Massachusetts.  February  28  and  June 
7,  1893.) 

Cash  register  case.  Indictment  of  members  of  a  combi- 
nation formed  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  price  of 
cash  registers.  A  demurrer  was  sustained  as  to  certain 
counts  of  the  indictment  and  overruled  as  to  others  and 
leave  granted  to  file  special  demurrers  to  the  counts  which 
were  sustained.  The  special  demurrers  were  heard  on 
June  1, 1893,  and  the  demurrers  overruled,  the  court  adher- 
ing to  its  former  ruling.  Letter  of  Attorney  General  dated 
October  16,  1893,  shows  case  was  allowed  to  lapse  because 
of  consolidation  of  complaining  witness  with  defendants. 

United  States  v.  E.  C.  Knight  Company   (Sugar  Trust),  60 
Fed.  Rep.,  306;  60  Fed.  Rep.,  934;  156  U.  S.,  1. 

(Circuit  Court,  E.  D.  Pennsylvania.    January  30,  1894.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Third  Circuit.     March  26, 
1894.) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  January  21,  1895.) 
Bill  in  equity  to  enjoin  the  operations  of  the  Sugar  Trust, 
charged  with  a  violation  of  the  antitrust  law.  The  bill  was 
dismissed  January  30,  1894.  Appeal  was  taken  to  the 
Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  and  the  decree  affirmed.  From 
this  decision  an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  where  the  decree  of  dismissal  was 
affirmed. 


PREsroENT   Cleveland's    Second   Administration,   March   4,    1893,   to 

March  4,  1897. 

[Richard  Olney,  Attorney  General,  March  6,  1893,  to  June  7,  1895;   Judson  Harmon, 

Attorney  General,  June  8,  1895,  to  March  5,  1897.] 


1. 


United  States  v.  Agler,  62  Fed.  Rep.,  824. 
(Circuit  Court,  Indiana.  July  12,  1894.) 
Information  charging  contempt  of  court  in  disobeying 
an  injunction  restraining  Agler  and  others  from  interfering 
with  interstate  commerce  and  obstructing  the  mails.  In- 
formation quashed.  It  was  charged  that  Agler  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  American  Railway  Union,  the  members  of  which 
order  were  on  a  strike  and  had  been  enjoined  under  the 


n 


^M 


"1 


2. 


3. 


22 

antitrust  law  from  interfering  with  the  carrying  of  the 
mails  and  from  obstructing  interstate  commerce.  This  is 
one  of  the  "  Debs  "  cases. 

United  States  v.  Elliott,  62  Fed.  Rep.,  801 ;  64  Fed.  Rep..  27. 
(Circuit  Court,  E.  D.  Missouri.    July  6  and  October  24, 

1894.) 

Suit  to  restrain  Elliott,  Debs,  and  others,  members  of  the 
American  Railway  Union,  from  carrying  out  their  unlawful 
conspiracy  to  interfere  with  interstate  commerce  and  to 
obstruct  the  carrying  of  the  mails,  in  violation  of  the  anti- 
trust law.  Preliminary  injunction  granted.  A  demurrer 
to  this  bill  was  overruled. 

United  States  v.  Debs  et  aU  64  Fed.  Rep.,  724. 

(Circuit  Court,  N.  D.  Illinois.  December  14,  1894.) 
Proceedings  in  contempt  to  punish  Debs  and  others  for 
disobeying  an  injunction  restraining  them  from  interfering 
with  interstate  commerce  and  with  obstructing  the  mails, 
by  means  of  a  conspiracy,  in  violation  of  the  antitrust 
law.    Defendants  found  guilty  and  punished. 


23 


3a. 


wlil 


4. 


In  re  Debs,  petitioner,  158  U.  S.,  564. 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  May  27, 1895.) 
Proceedings  instituted  July  2,  1894.  Application  for  a 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  secure  a  discharge  from  imprison- 
ment for  disobeying  an  injunction  of  the  Circuit  Court  for 
the  Northern  District  of  Illinois,  restraining  Debs  and 
others  from  conspiring  to  interfere  with  interstate  com- 
merce, in  violation  of  the  antitrust  law. 
Petition  for  the  writ  denied. 

United  States  v.  Cassidy,  67  Fed.  Rep.,  698. 

(District  Court,  N.  D.  California.  April  1  and  2, 1895.) 
Cassidy  and  others  were  indicted  under  section  5440, 
United  States  Revised  Statutes,  for  conspiring  to  commit 
offenses  against  the  United  States,  which  acts  consisted  in 
a  combining  and  conspiring  to  restrain  trade  and  com- 
merce between  the  States,  in  violation  of  the  antitrust  law, 
and  grew  out  of  the  Pullman  strike  in  California.  The 
trial  lasted  five  months  and  resulted  in  a  disagreement  of 
the  Jury. 


5. 


6. 


7. 


Moore  v.  United  States,  85  Fed.  Rep.,  465. 

(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Eighth  Circuit.  February  14, 
1898.) 

Indictment  of  the  members  of  an  association  of  dealers 
in  coal  at  Salt  Lake  City  for  entering  into  a  conspiracy  to 
regulate  the  price  of  coal.  Indictment  returned  November 
4,  1895.  Moore  was  tried  and  convicted  in  the  District 
Court  of  Utah  upon  this  indictment.  The  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  reversed  the  judgment  of  conviction,  for  the  rea- 
son that  upon  the  admission  of  Utah  as  a  State  it  was  no 
longer  a  "  Territory  "  within  the  meaning  of  the  antitrust 
act,  and  the  combination  was  not  in  restraint  of  interstate 
commerce,  and  the  court  therefore  had  no  jurisdiction 
of  the  offense. 

United  States  v.  Joint  Traffic  Association,  76  Fed.  Rep.,  895; 
89  Fed.  Rep.,  1020;  171  U.  S.,  505. 

(Circuit  Court,  S.  D.  New  York.    May  28,  1896.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Second  Circuit    March  19, 
1897.) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  October  28, 1898.) 
Suit  instituted  January  8,  1896.  Rill  in  equity  to  enjoin 
the  alleged  violation  of  the  antitrust  law  by.  a  combination 
of  railroads.  The  Circuit  Court  dismissed  the  bill,  and 
the  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the  action  of  the  Circuit 
Court.  These  judgments  were  reversed  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court. 

United  States  v.  Addgston  Pipe  and  Steel  Company,  78  Fed. 
Rep.,  712;  85  Fed.  Rep.,  271;  175  U.  S.,  211. 

(Circuit  Court,  E.  D.  Tennessee.    February  5, 1897.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Sixth  Circuit.    February  8. 
1898.) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  December  4,  1899.) 
Suit  instituted  December  10,  1896.  Rill  in  equity  to  en- 
join the  operations  of  the  Cast-Iron  Pipe  Trust,  which 
attempted  to  control  the  price  of  cast-iron  pipe.  The  bill 
was  dismissed  by  the  Circuit  Court.  The  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  reversed  the  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  and  re- 
manded the  case,  with  instructions  to  enter  a  decree  for 
the  Government.  On  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  the 
action  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  was  affirmed. 


24 


8. 


United  States  v.  Hopkins  et  al.,  82  Fed.  Rep.,  529;  84  Fed. 
Rep.,  1018;  171  U.  S.,  578. 

(Circuit  Court,  Kansas.     September  20,  1897.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Eighth  Circuit.     December 
27,  1897.) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  October  24,  1898.) 
Suit  instituted  December  31,  1896.  Bill  to  restrain  the 
operations  of  the  "Kansas  City  Live  Stock  Exchange,'* 
organized  to  control  the  shipments  of  live  stock.  The  in- 
junction was  granted,  but  on  appeal  the  Supreme  Court 
reversed  the  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  and  remanded  the 
case,  with  instructions  to  dismiss  the  bill. 

President  McKinley*s  Administration— March  4,  1897-September  14, 

1901. 

[Joseph  McKenna.  Attorney  General,  March  5,  1897,  to  June  25,  1898;  John  W.  Griggs, 
Attorney  General.  June  25,  1898,  to  March  29,  1901;  Philander  C.  Knox,  Attorney 
General,  April  5,  1901,  to  June  30,  1904.] 


Jil* 


Anderson  v.  United  States,  82  Fed.  Rep.,  998;  171  U.  S.,  604. 

(Circuit  Court,  N.  D.  Missouri.    .) 

(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Eighth  Circuit.    .) 

(United  States  Supreme  Court.  October  24,  1898.) 
Bill  in  equity  to  restrain  the  operations  of  "  The  Traders* 
Live  Stock  Exchange,"  of  Kansas  City,  an  association 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  buying  cattle  on  the  market. 
This  suit  was  instituted  June  7,  1897,  in  the  Circuit  Court 
of  the  United  States  for  the  Western  District  of  Missouri. 
Decree  of  temporary  injunction  was  granted  and  the  case 
appealed  to  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Eighth 
Circuit.  From  there  it  was  certified  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  for  instructions  upon  certain  ques- 
tions, under  the  provisions  of  section  6  of  the  act  of  March 
3,  1891  (26  Stat.,  828).  The  Supreme  Court  reversed  the 
decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  and  remanded  the  case,  with 
directions  to  dismiss  the  bill,  holding  that  the  acts  com- 
plained of  were  not  a  violation  of  the  antitrust  law. 

United  States  v.  Coal  Dealers'  Association,  85  Fed.  Rep.,  252. 
(Circuit  Court,  N.  D.  California.    January  28,  1898.) 
Suit  brought  December  16,  1897.    Bill  for  injunction  to 
restrain  the  operations  of  a  combination  of  coal  dealers 
known  as  the  "  Coal  Dealers'  Association  of  California." 
A  temporary  injunction  was  granted. 


25 

3. 

United  States  v.  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Fuel  Company  et  aL. 
105  Fed.  Rep.,  93;  115  Fed.  Rep.,  610. 

(Circuit  Court,  S.  D.  Ohio.  August  31,  1900.) 
(Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  Sixth  Circuit.  April  8,  1902.) 
Bill  filed  May  8,  1899,  to  annul  a  contract  and  dissolve 
a  combination  of  producers  and  shippers  of  coal  in  Ohio 
and  West  Virginia,  engaged  in  mining  coal  and  making 
coke  intended  for  "  Western  shipment,"  under  agreement 
to  sell  the  same  at  not  less  than  a  memorandum  price,  to  be 
fixed  by  an  executive  committee  appointed  by  the  pro- 
ducers. Defendants  enjoined,  contract  declared  void  and 
illegal,  and  the  combination  dissolved. 

Affirmed  by  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals.    No  appeal  taken. 

President  Roosevelt's  Administration — September  14,  1901-March  4, 

1909. 

[Philander  C.  Knox,  Attorney  General,  April  5,  1901,  to  June  30,  1904;  William  H. 
Moody,  Attorney  General,  July  1,  1904,  to  December  16,  1906;  Charles  J.  Bonaparte, 
Attorney  General,  December  17,  1906,  to  March  4,  1909.] 


1. 


United  States  v.  Northern  Securities  Co.,  Great  Northern  R'y 
Co,,  Northern  Pacific  R'y  Co.  et  al.,  120  F.  R.,  721;  193 
U.  S.,  197. 

(Circuit  Court,  Minnesota.  April  9,  1903.) 
(United  States  Supreme  Court.  March  14, 1904.) 
This  suit  was  brought  on  March  10,  1902,  in  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Minne- 
sota, to  enjoin  the  defendant,  the  Northern  Securities  Co., 
from  purchasing,  acquiring,  receiving,  holding,  voting,  or 
in  any  manner  acting  as  the  owner  of  any  of  the  shares  of 
the  capital  stock  of  the  two  defendant  railway  companies, 
and  to  restrain  the  defendant  railway  companies  from 
permitting  the  securities  company  to  vote  any  of  the  stock 
of  said  railways,  or  from  exercising  any  control  whatso- 
ever over  the  corporate  acts  of  either  of  said  railway  com- 
panies, it  being  charged  that  the  securities  company  was 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  a  majority  of  the  capi- 
tal stock  of  the  two  railway  companies  in  order  that  it 
might  in  that  way  efTect  practically  a  consolidation  of  the 
two  companies  by  controlling  rates  and  restricting  and 
destroying  competition,  in  violation  of  the  Sherman  anti- 
trust law. 


m 


26 

The  Circuit  Court  on  April  9,  1903,  entered  a  decree 
in  favor  of  the  Government  as  prayed  in  the  petition, 
and  this  decree  was,  on  March  14,  1904,  affirmed  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 


«f* 


United  States  v.  Swift  &  Co.  et  a/.,  122  F.  R.,  529;  196  U.  S., 
375.  Suit  brought  on  May  10,  1902,  in  the  Circuit  Court  of 
the  United  States  for  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois  to 
restrain  the  defendants  (commonly  known  as  the  Beef 
Trust),  who  are  engaged  in  the  buying  of  live  stock  and  the 
selling  of  dressed  meats,  from  carrjang  out  an  unlawful 
conspiracy  entered  into  between  themselves  and  with  the 
various  railway  companies,  to  suppress  competition  and  to 
obtain  a  monopoly  in  the  purchase  of  live  stock  and  in  the 
selling  of  dressed  meats.  A  preliminary  restraining  order 
was  granted  on  May  20, 1902. 

The  defendants  having  demurred  to  the  bill,  the  court, 
after  hearing,  on  April  18,  1903,  overruled  the  demurrers 
and  granted  a  preliminary  injunction.  The  defendants 
having  failed  to  answer,  the  court,  on  May  26, 1903,  entered 
an  order  making  the  decree  final  and  perpetually  enjoining 
the  further  operations  of  the  trust. 

The  defendants,  on  August  14,  1903,  appealed  from  the 
final  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States,  where  decree  was  affirmed  January  30, 
1905. 

United  States  v.  The  Federal  Salt  Company  et  ah  Suit 
brought  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Northern  District  of  California,  on  October  15,  1902,  to  re- 
strain the  defendants  (known  as  the  Salt  Trust)  from  un- 
lawfully combining  and  conspiring  to  suppress  competition 
in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  salt  in  the  States  west  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains,  in  violation  of  the  Sherman  antitrust 
law.  A  temporary  restraining  order  was  issued  on  that 
date,  and  the  cause  coming  on  for  hearing,  the  court,  on 
November  10,  1902,  granted  an  injunction  pendente  lite, 
thus,  in  effect,  making  the  restraining  order  perpetual. 
No  appeal  was  taken  from  this  order. 


United  States  v.  The  Federal  Salt  Company.  On  February  28, 
1903,  the  grand  jury  for  the  United  States  District  Court 
for  the  Northern  District  of  California  returned  an  indict- 


5. 


6. 


7. 


27 

ment  against  the  Salt  Trust  for  having  violated  the  anti- 
trust law. 

On  May  12,  1903,  the  trust  pleaded  guilty,  and  the  court 
sentenced  it  to  pay  a  fine  of  $1,000,  which  was  paid. 

United  States  v.  Jacksonville  Wholesale  Grocers*  Association. 
A  proceeding  in  equity,  instituted  on  September  12,  1903, 
in  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the  Southern  District 
of  Florida,  for  the  purpose  of  dissolving  a  combination  of 
wholesale  grocers,  operating  in  violation  of  the  antitrust 

law. 

November  1,  1907,  dismissed. 

United  States  v.  General  Paper  Co,  et  al  December  27, 1904, 
a  bill  in  equity  was  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
States  for  the  District  of  Minnesota  against  the  General 
Paper  Co.  and  twenty-three  other  corporations  engaged  in 
the  manufacture  and  sale  of  paper,  alleging  that  they  had 
entered  into  a  combination  and  conspiracy  to  restrain  trade 
and  commerce  in  the  manufacture  of  news  print,  manila, 
fiber,  and  other  papers  by  making  the  General  Paper  Co. 
their  common  sales  agent.  On  May  11,  1906,  the  court 
ordered  judgment  in  favor  of  the  Government,  dissolving 
the  combination  and  affording  all  relief  prayed  in  the  bill. 
(See  also  Nelson  v.  United  States,  201  U.  S.,  92;  Alexander 
V.  United  States,  id.,  117.) 

United  States  v.  Armour  &  Co.  et  al.  After  the  affirmance 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  decree  of  the  Circuit  Court 
in  United  States  v.  Swift  &  Company  (above  referred  to) 
complaints  from  various  quarters  were  made  to  the  depart- 
ment that  the  combination  still  continued.  The  department 
thereupon  began  an  exhaustive  inquiry  before  the  grand 
jury  for  the  northern  district  of  Illinois,  which  resulted  in 
the  return  of  an  indictment  on  July  1, 1905,  against  Armour 
&  Co.,  J.  Ogden  Armour,  president;  Patrick  A.  Valentine, 
treasurer;  Arthur  Neekler,  general  manager;  Thomas  J. 
Connors,  superintendent,  and  Samuel  A.  McRoberts,  assist- 
ant treasurer,  of  Armour  &  Co.;  the  Armour  Packing  Co., 
and  Charles  W.  Armour,  president;  Swift  &  Co.,  and  Louis 
F.  Swift,  president;  Lawrence  A.  Carton,  treasurer;  D. 
Edwin  Hartwell,  secretary,  and  Albert  H.  Veeder  and 
Robert  C.  McManus  and  Arthur  F.  Evans,  agents  of  Swift  & 
Co.;  the  Fairbank  Canning  Co.,  and  Edward  Morris,  vice 


a 


8a. 


28 

president;  Ira  N.  Morris,  secretary  of  the  Fairbank  Canning 
Co.;  the  Cudahy  Packing  Co.,  and  Edward  A.  Cudahy,  vice 
president  and  general  manager  of  the  Cudahy  Packing  Co. 
Against  this  indictment  many  preliminary  objections 
were  urged.  All  were  disposed  of  in  favor  of  the  Govern- 
ment, except  certain  special  pleas  of  immunity  in  bar, 
based  upon  information  concerning  the  matters  for  which 
the  defendants  were  indicted,  which  they  had  given  to  the 
Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor.  The  court  sustained 
the  pleas  so  far  as  the  individual  defendants  were  con- 
cerned and  overruled  them  with  respect  to  the  corporations. 

United  States  v.  MacAndrews  <&  Forbes  Company  et  al 
(149  Fed.,  823;  212  U.  S.,  585.)  In  June,  1906,  the  grand 
jury  returned  an  indictment  against  the  MacAndrews  & 
Forbes  Co.,  the  J.  S.  Young  Co.,  a  corporation  of  Maine, 
and  Karl  Jungbluth  and  Howard  E.  Young,  their  respective 
presidents,  for  illegally  combining  and  conspiring  to  regu- 
late the  interstate  trade  and  sale  in  licorice  paste,  an  article 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  plug  and  smoking  tobacco, 
snuff,  and  cigars.  Defendants  entered  pleas  of  not  guilty, 
with  leave  to  withdraw  or  demur  on  or  before  July  9,  1906*. 
July  9,  1906,  demurrers  filed  by  all  of  the  defendants!  De- 
cember 4,  1906,  demurrers  overruled.  December  19,  1906, 
trial  commenced.  January  10,  1907,  MacAndrews  &  Forbes 
Co.  was  found  guilty  on  first  and  third  counts  of  indictment, 
the  J.  S.  Young  Co.  guilty  on  first  and  third  counts;  verdict 
of  acquittal  as  to  individual  defendants.  MacAndrews  & 
Forbes  Co.  fined  $10,000.    J.  S.  Young  Co.  fined  $8,000. 


The  Tobacco  Trust  Cases.  (Hale  v.  Henkel,  201  U.  S.,  43; 
McAlister  v.  Henkel,  id.,  90;  149  Fed.,  823;  212  U.  S.,  585.) 
These  cases  grew  out  of  an  investigation  by  a  Federal  grand 
jury  in  the  southern  district  of  New  York  of  the  American 
Tobacco  Co.  and  the  MacAndrews  &  Forbes  Co.,  believed 
to  be  violating  the  antitrust  laws,  the  matter  having  been 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  grand  jury  by  the  officers 
of  the  Department  of  Justice,  special  counsel  having  been 
appointed  for  the  purpose  of  investigation  and  prosecution. 
Subpoenas  duces  tecum  were  served  upon  the  officers  of  the 
companies  directing  them  to  produce  papers  and  other 
documentary  evidence  belonging  to  the  corporations. 
They  refused  to  obey  the  subpoena  to  answer  questions 
propounded  to  them.  The  Circuit  Court  adjudged  them  in 
contempt  and  committed  them  until  thev  should  produce 


9. 


29 

the  books  and  answer  the  questions.  They  applied  to  an- 
other judge  of  the  same  court  for  writs  of  habeas  corpus, 
which,  upon  hearing,  were  discharged.  Upon  appeal  the 
Supreme  Court  affirmed  the  orders  denying  the  writs. 

United  States  v.  Metropolitan  Meat  Company  et  al.  Bill  filed 
in  equity  in  October,  1905,  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  for  Hawaii,  to  restrain  the  operation  of  alleged  un- 
lawful combinations  in  restraint  of  the  trade  in  beef  and 
beef  products.  Demurrer  to  bill  overruled  October  2, 1906. 
Pending. 


10. 


United  States  v.  Nome  Retail  Grocers'  Association.  Novem- 
ber 4,  1905,  the  department  directed  the  United  States  at- 
torney for  the  Second  Division  of  Alaska  to  file  a  bill  in 
equity  against  the  Nome  Retail  Grocers'  Association,  alleg- 
ing a  combination  to  fix  prices  and  to  suppress  competition. 
Suit  was  promptly  instituted,  whereupon  the  defendants 
agreed  to  the  entry  of  a  decree  granting  all  the  relief  prayed 
for  in  the  petition.  A  decree  dissolving  the  combination 
was  entered  accordingly. 


11. 


United  States  v.  Terminal  Railroad  Association  of  St.  Louis 
et  al.  Petition  filed  in  Circuit  Court  of  United  States  for 
the  Eastern  District  of  Missouri  on  December  1,  1905,  to 
enjoin  the  defendant  railroads  from  continuing  an  unlaw- 
ful combination  entered  into  between  them  to  operate 
Eads  Bridge  and  Merchants  Bridge  as  a  common  agency 
of  interstate  commerce.  Upon  disagreement  of  Circuit 
Judges  case  was  carried  to  the  Supreme  Court  and  was 
remanded  by  that  court  for  further  proceedings.  Govern- 
ment then  attempted  to  secure  rehearing  in  the  Circuit 
Court  and  failed,  and  appealed  to  the  Supreme  Court, 
where  the  case  was  argued  and  is  awaiting  decision. 


12. 


United  States  v.  Allen  &  Robinson  et  al.  Bill  filed  in  Octo- 
ber in  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the  District  of  Hawaii, 
alleging  unlawful  combination  to  control  the  trade  in  lum- 
ber in  that  Territory.  Answers  filed  January  2,  1906. 
Pending. 


13. 


United  States  v.  Otis  Elevator  Co.  et  al.  Bill  filed  March  7, 
1906,  in  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the  Northern 
District  of  California  against  the  Otis  Elevator  Co.  and  a 
number  of  other  corporations  and  individuals,  in  which  it 


•^^^^m^mr-z 


14. 


30 

was  alleged  that  they  were  maintaining  a  combination  in 
restraint  of  trade  in  the  matter  of  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  elevators.  June  1,  1906,  a  decree  was  entered  by 
consent  dissolving  the  combination  and  granting  the  relief 
prayed. 


United  States  v.  F.  A.  Amsden  Lumber  Company  et  aL  In- 
dictment returned  in  the  District  Court  of  Oklahoma  May  4, 
1906,  for  violation  of  the  Sherman  Act  in  restricting  com- 
petition and  maintaining  prices  in  the  sale  of  lumber.  May 
13,  1907,  change  of  venue  granted  to  Grant  County.  Sep- 
tember 25,  1907,  pleas  of  guilty  and  fines  imposed  aggre- 
gating $2,000,  which  were  paid. 


15. 


United  States  v.  National  Association  of  Retail  Druggists  et  al. 
Bill  in  equity  filed  May  9, 1906,  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  for  the  District  of  Indiana  against  the  National  Asso- 
ciation of  Retail  Druggists,  alleging  a  combination  in  re- 
straint of  interstate  trade  in  the  sale  of  drugs  and  propri- 
etary medicines.  May  9,  1907,  final  decree  entered  by 
agreement,  giving  the  Government  all  the  relief  prayed  for 
in  the  petition. 


16. 


United  States  v.  Virginia-Carolina  Chemical  Company  et  aL 
May  25, 1906,  the  Federal  grand  jury  for  the  Middle  District 
of  Tennessee,  upon  information  furnished  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  Justice,  returned  an  indictment  against  31  corpora- 
tions and  25  individuals  engaged  in  the  fertilizer  business 
in  the  States  of  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia, 
Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Arkansas,  and  Tennessee, 
charging  them  with  engaging  in  a  conspiracy  in  violation  of 
the  Federal  antitrust  act  and  with  conspiring  to  commit 
an  offense  against  the  United  States,  viz,  the  aforesaid  con- 
spiracy, in  violation  of  section  5440  of  the  Revised  Stat- 
utes. The  fertilizer  manufacturers  combined  to  fix  the 
price  of  fertilizers  in  the  territory  mentioned  and  to  appor- 
tion the  trade  among  themselves  according  to  an  agreed 
percentage.  July  11,  1906,  all  the  defendants  appealed  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  from  an  order  of 
the  Circuit  Court  of  the  Eastern  District  of  Virginia  deny- 
ing the  right  of  habeas  corpus  and  remanding  them  to  the 
custody  of  the  marshal  for  removal  to  the  Middle  District 
of  Tennessee  for  trial.  The  case  before  the  Supreme  Court 
was  argued  on  December  3, 1906,  and  on  March  4, 1907,  the 
judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of 


17. 


31 

Virginia  was  reversed  and  the  case  remanded  to  that  court 
for  further  proceedings  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of 
the  Supreme  Court.  April  17,  1908,  various  motions,  pleas 
in  abatement,  and  demurrers  filed.  July  3,  1908,  certain 
motions  and  demurrers  overruled,  plea  in  abatement 
allowed,  and  indictment  quashed. 


United  States  v.  American  Ice  Company  et  al.  July  12,  1906, 
indictment  returned  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  charging  an  unlawful  agreement  to  control 
prices  and  restrict  competition  in  the  sale  of  ice.  Case 
pending. 


18. 


United  States  v.  Chandler  Ice  and  Cold  Storage  Plant  et  al. 
September  19,  1906,  indictment  returned  in  the  District 
Court  for  the  Territory  of  Oklahoma  against  the  Chandler 
Ice  and  Cold  Storage  Plant  and  others,  charging  a  combi- 
nation to  apportion  territory  in  the  matter  of  the  sale  of  ice. 
May  5,  1907,  demurrer  filed  by  defendant  Groves  and  over- 
ruled. May  20,  1907,  demurrer  filed  by  Chandler  Ice  and 
Cold  Storage  Plant.    Dismissed. 


19. 


United  States  v.  Alfred  M.  Gloyd  et  al.  September  21,  1906, 
indictment  returned  against  Alfred  M.  Gloyd  and  others  in 
the  District  Court  for  the  Territory  of  Oklahoma,  charging 
a  combination  to  maintain  prices  and  restrict  competition 
in  the  sale  of  lumber.    Dismissed. 


20. 


United  States  v.  People*s  Ice  and  Fuel  Company,  a  corpora- 
tion, and  W.  B.  Lount.  October  23,  1906,  indictment  re- 
turned in  the  District  Court  for  the  Territory  of  Arizona, 
charging  a  combination  to  control  prices  and  restrict  com- 
petition in  the  sale  of  ice.  January  5,  1907,  trial  com- 
menced. Verdict  not  guilty  as  to  People's  Ice  and  Fuel  Co. 
and  company  held  to  next  grand  jury.  Trial  of  W.  B.  Lount 
continued  over  term.  October  16,  1907,  plea  in  bar  filed. 
October  17, 1907,  plea  in  bar  sustained. 


21. 


United  States  v.  Demund  Lumber  Company  et  al.  October 
23,  1906,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  for  the 
Territory  of  Arizona,  charging  a  combination  to  control 
prices  and  restrict  competition  in  the  sale  of  lumber.  Jan- 
uary 2,  1907,  trial  commenced.  Verdict  of  not  guilty  as  to 
Demund  Lumber  Co.  January  7, 1907,  cases  against  Cham- 
berlain Lumber  Co.  and  Valley  Lumber^Co.  continued  over 


\r\ 


22, 


32 

term.  May  8,  1907,  motion  made  to  court  to  instruct  for 
acquittal.  Motion  argued  and  taken  under  advisement. 
May  9,  1907,  motion  sustained  and  verdict  of  acquittal 
returned. 

United  States  v.  Phoenix  Wholesale  Meat  and  Produce  Com- 
pany, a  corporation,  P.  T.  Hurley,  and  S.  J.  Tribolet.  Octo- 
ber 23,  1906,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  for 
the  Territory  of  Arizona,  charging  a  combination  to  control 
prices  and  restrict  competition  in  the  sale  of  meats.  Jan- 
uary 7,  1907,  trial  commenced.  Verdict  of  not  guilty  as  to 
Phoenix  Wholesale  Meat  &  Produce  Co.  January  8,  1907, 
indictment  against  Hurley  dismissed.  Verdict  of  guilty  as 
to  defendant  S.  J.  Tribolet.  January  12,  1907,  Tribolet  sen- 
tenced to  pay  fine  of  $1,000.  January  9,  1907,  case  against 
Phoenix  Wholesale  Meat  &  Produce  Co.  dismissed.  Appeal 
to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Territory  of  Arizona.  Su- 
preme Court  affirmed  decision  of  lower  court.    Fine  paid. 


«tf* 


United  States  v.  Standard  Oil  Company  of  N.  J.  et  al, 
(United  States  Circuit  Court  En.  Mo.,  173  Fed.,  177.) 
(United  States  Supreme  Court,  221  U.  S.,  1.) 

November  15,  1906,  bill  in  equity  filed  in  United  States 
Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Missouri  against 
the  Standard  Oil  Co.  and  others,  in  which  it  is  alleged  that 
they  are  maintaining  a  combination  in  restraint  of  trade 
in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  petroleum.  Case  argued  in 
Circuit  Court  April,  1909;  decision  by  unanimous  court  in 
favor  of  the  Government  November  20,  1909.  Appealed  to 
Supreme  Court;  argued  March,  1910,  reargued  January, 
1911,  and  judgment  affirmed  May  15, 1911. 


24. 


United  States  v.  T.  B.  Hogg  et  al  December  8,  1906,  indict- 
ment returned  in  the  District  Court  for  the  Territory  of 
Oklahoma,  charging  a  combination  and  conspiracy  in  re- 
straint of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  sale  of  lumber. 
March  25, 1907,  plea  of  not  guilty.  Change  of  judge  granted 
on  application  of  defendants.    Dismissed. 


25. 


United  States  v.  Atlantic  Investment  Company  et  al,  Feb- 
ruary 11,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  United  States 
District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  Georgia  against 
the  Atlantic  Investment  Co.  and  others,  charging  a  combi- 
nation in  restraint  of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  matter 
of  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  turpentine.    February  18, 


26. 


33 

1907,  four  corporations  and  two  individuals,  defendants  to 
this  indictment,  entered  pleas  of  guilty,  and  the  court  im- 
posed a  fine  of  $5,000  upon  each  of  the  six  defendants, 
making  a  total  of  $30,000. 


United  States  v.  American  Seating  Company  et  al.  March 
12,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  of  the 
Northern  District  of  Illinois  charging  a  violation  of  the 
Sherman  antitrust  law  by  engaging  in  a  combination  in 
restraint  of  trade  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  school 
and  church  furniture.  April  1,  1907,  defendant  corpora- 
tions entered  pleas  of  guilty,  with  one  exception.  May  20, 
1907,  fines  imposed  aggregating  $43,000.  Defendant  E.  H. 
Stafford  Manufacturing  Co.  filed  demurrer  April  3,  1907. 
May  31,  1907,  demurrer  overruled  and  plea  of  not  guilty 
entered. 


27. 


United  States  v.  American  Seating  Company  et  al,  March 
12,  1907,  bill  in  equity  filed  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois  against  the 
American  Seating  Co.  and  others,  in  which  it  is  alleged 
that  they  are  maintaining  a  combination  in  restraint  of 
trade  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  school  and  church 
furniture.  August  15,  1907,  decree  entered  granting  per- 
petual injunction  against  all  defendants,  except  E.  H. 
Staff'ord  Manufacturing  Co.,  E.  H.  Stafford,  E.  M.  Stafford, 
and  E.  G.  Bentley. 


28. 


United  States  v.  Santa  Rita  Mining  Company  and  Santa  Rita 
Store  Company.  April  4,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the 
district  of  New  Mexico  charging  a  violation  of  section  3  of 
the  Sherman  antitrust  law  for  engaging  in  a  combination 
in  restraint  of  trade.  Demurrer  filed  and  overruled.  Fine 
of  $1,0(K)  imposed  on  each  defendant;  total,  $2,0(X).  Ap- 
peal taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Territory  of  New 
Mexico. 


29. 


United  States  v.  The  Reading  Company  et  al.  United  States 
Circuit  Court,  En.  Pa.,  183  Fed.,  427.  June  12,  1907,  bill  in 
equity  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of 
Pennsylvania  to  dissolve  a  combination  among  the  anthra- 
cite coal-carrying  roads  and  others,  alleged  to  be  operating 
in  violation  of  the  Sherman  law.  December  8,  1910,  de- 
cision dismissing  petition,  except  as  to  Temple  Iron  Co., 


1 1 


ii 


I 


■i^ 


34 

which  was  adjudged  illegal.  Cross  appeals  taken  to  Su- 
preme Court,  where  case  was  argued  in  October,  1911. 
Awaiting  decision. 


35 


30. 


United  States  v.  National  Umbrella  Frame  Company  et  al, 
July  1,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  for 
the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania  charging  a  conspiracy 
to  restrain  interstate  trade  and  commerce  in  the  manufac- 
ture and  sale  of  umbrella  material,  in  violation  of  the 
Sherman  antitrust  law  and  section  5440,  R.  S.  Pleas  of 
guilty  entered  and  fines  aggregating  $3,000  imposed. 


31. 


United  States  v.  American  Tobacco  Company  et  al. 
(United  States  Circuit  Court,  Sn.  N.  Y.,  164  Fed.,  700.) 
(United  States  Supreme  Court,  221  U.  S.,  106.) 

Bill  in  equity  filed  July  10,  1907,  by  the  United  States 
against  the  American  Tobacco  Co.  and  others,  in  which  it 
was  alleged  that  they  were  maintaining  a  combination  in 
restraint  of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  manufacture  and 
sale  of  tobacco.  November  7,  1908,  decision  rendered  in 
favor  of  the  Government,  except  as  to  individual  defend- 
ants and  certain  foreign  and  other  corporations.  Cross 
appeals  were  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court,  where  case  was 
argued  March,  1910,  and  reargued  January,  1911.  May  29, 
1911,  a  decision  was  rendered  sustaining  the  Government 
on  every  point. 


32. 


United  States  v.  E  H,  Stafford  Manufacturing  Company  et  al. 
July  10,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  for 
the  Northern  District  of  Illinois  charging  a  violation  of  the 
Sherman  antitrust  law  by  engaging  in  a  combination  in 
restraint  of  trade  in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  school 
and  church  furniture.     Case  pending. 


33. 


United  States  v.  E.  I.  du  Pont  de  Nemours  &  Co.  et  al.  July 
30,  1907,  bill  in  equity  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  for  the 
District  of  Delaware  against  E.  I.  du  Pont  de  Nemours  & 
Co.  and  others,  in  which  it  is  alleged  that  they  are  main- 
taining a  combination  in  restraint  of  trade  in  the  manufac- 
ture and  sale  of  gunpowder  and  other  high  explosives. 
June  21, 1911,  a  decision  was  rendered  holding  combination 
illegal  and  ordering  its  dissolution.  Negotiations  are  now 
under  way  for  an  agreement  between  counsel  as  to  a  form 
of  decree  of  dissolution  and  injunction,  to  be  submitted  to 
the  court  for  approval. 


34. 


35. 


United  States  v.  One  Hundred  and  Seventy-five  Cases  of 
Cigarettes.  October  28,  1907,  information  filed  in  the  Dis- 
trict Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Virginia  covering  the 
seizure  of  175  cases  of  cigarettes  under  section  6  of  the 
Sherman  Antitrust  Act.    Case  pending. 


36. 


United  States  v.  H.  D.  Corbett  Stationery  Company  et  al, 
November  1, 1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court 
for  the  District  of  Arizona  charging  a  combination  in  re- 
straint of  trade.  November  4,  1907,  demurrer  filed.  No- 
vember 14,  1907,  demurrers  sustained  and  defendants 
referred  to  next  grand  jury.  October  28,  1908,  reindicted. 
November  6,  1908,  verdict  not  guilty. 


37. 


United  States  v.  Union  Pacific  Coal  Company  et  al.,  173  Fed., 
737.  November  20,  1907,  indictment  returned  in  the  Dis- 
trict Court  for  the  District  of  Utah,  charging  a  conspiracy 
to  violate  and  a  violation  of  the  Sherman  Act.  January  6, 
1908,  demurrer  filed.  March  2,  1908,  demurrer  sustained 
as  to  first  count  and  overruled  as  to  second  count.  Decem- 
ber 3,  1908,  verdict  guilty.  March  29,  1909,  fines  aggregat- 
ing $4,0(X)  imposed.    November,  1909,  judgment  reversed. 


38. 


United  States  v.  Chas.  L.  Simmons  et  al.  January  20,  1908, 
indictment  returned  in  the  District  Court  for  the  Southern 
District  of  Alabama  charging  a  combination  in  restraint 
of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  matter  of  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  plumbers'  supplies.  December  1,  1910,  pleas 
of  guilty,  and  fines  aggregating  $265  imposed. 


39. 


United  States  v.  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Company  et  al.  Feb- 
ruary 1,  1908,  a  bill  in  equity  was  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court 
of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Utah,  charging  a 
combination  and  conspiracy  in  violation  of  the  Sherman 
Act  on  the  part  of  the  so-called  Harriman  lines.  June  23, 
1911,  decision  by  Circuit  Court  to  the  effect  that  the  roads 
involved  were  not  competing  lines  and  hence  the  combina- 
tion was  not  a  violation  of  law.  Hook,  J.,  dissenting.  The 
Government  has  appealed  to  Supreme  Court.  Case  set  for 
argument  at  January  term,  1912. 


United  States  v.  E.  J.  Ray  et  al  February  14, 1908,  indictment 
returned  in  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of 
Louisiana  against  seventy-two  laborers,  charging  a  combi- 
nation and  conspiracy  in  restraint  of  foreign  trade  and 
commerce,  in  violation  of  the  Sherman  Act. 


36 


40. 


United  States  v.  E.  J,  Ray  et  al  February  15, 1908,  indictment 
returned  in  the  Circuit  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of 
Louisiana  against  seventy-two  laborers,  charging  a  combi- 
nation and  conspiracy  in  restraint  of  interstate  trade  and 
commerce,  in  violation  of  the  Sherman  Act.  January  26, 
1911,  cases  consolidated  for  trial.  Verdict  of  guilty  as  to 
three  defendants  and  fines  amounting  to  $110  imposed. 


41. 


United  States  v.  Joseph  Stiefvater  et  al.  February  15,  1908, 
indictment  returned  in  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for 
the  Eastern  District  of  Louisiana,  charging  a  combination 
in  restraint  of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  matter  of  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  plumbers'  supplies.  June  25, 1910, 
dismissed. 


42. 


United  States  v.  American  Naval  Stores  Company  et  al.  (151 
Fed.,  834;  charge  to  grand  jury,  186  Fed.,  592).  April  11, 
1908,  indictment  returned  in  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  Georgia,  charging  a  com- 
bination in  restraint  of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  matter 
of  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  turpentine.  May  10,  1909, 
verdict  guilty  as  to  five  individual  defendants.  Fines  ag- 
gregating $17,500  imposed  and  two  defendants  sentenced 
to  three  months  in  jail.  Appealed  to  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals  and  judgment  affirmed.  Certiorari  granted  to 
Supreme  Court,  where  case  is  now  pending. 


43. 


United  States  v.  New  York,  New  Haven,  and  Hartford  Rail- 
road Company  et  al.  (165  Fed.,  742.)  May  22,  1908,  a 
bill  in  equity  was  filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
States  for  the  District  of  Massachusetts,  charging  the  New 
Haven  Co.  with  combining  and  attempting  to  combine 
under  one  common  control  the  various  railroad  and 
electric  railway  systems  in  New  England  in  violation  of 
the  Sherman  Act. 

Dismissed  June  26, 1909. 


"J.. 


United  States  v.  John  H.  Parks  et  al.  June  16,  1908,  indict- 
ment returned  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for 
the  Southern  District  of  New  York,  charging  a  combina- 
tion in  restraint  of  trade  in  the  matter  of  the  manufacture 
and  sale  of  paper.  June  19,  1908,  defendants  plead  guilty 
and  sentenced  to  pay  fines  aggregating  $50,000,  which  were 
paid. 


1. 


2. 


3. 


5. 


6. 


37 

President  Taft's  Administration,  March  4,  1909. 

[Geo.  W.  Wickersham,  Attorney  General,  March  4,  1909.] 

United  States  v.  American  Sugar  Refining  Company  et  al. 
Indictment  under  Sherman  law  July  1,  1909.  A  plea  of  the 
statute  of  limitations  was  interposed  by  the  defendant 
Kissell,  which  was  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court,  where  it 
was  decided  in  favor  of  the  Government.  (See  U.  S.  v. 
Kissell  218  U.  S.,  601.)     Pending. 

United  States  v.  Albia  Box  d;  Paper  Company  et  al.  Decem- 
ber 7,  1909,  indictment  returned  in  Southern  District 
of  New  York  charging  combination  in  restraint  of  trade 
in  paper  board.  February  7,  1910,  all  defendants  plead 
guilty  and  fines  aggregating  $57,000  were  assessed. 

United  States  v.  John  S.  Steers  et  al.  Indictment  returned 
in  Eastern  District  of  Kentucky  February  17,  1910,  charg- 
ing conspiracy  to  restrain  trade.  This  is  the  so-called 
*'Night  Rider"  case  where  the  restraint  consisted  in  pre- 
venting the  shipment  of  tobacco  in  interstate  commerce 
by  means  of  violence  and  intimidation.  After  the  over- 
ruling of  demurrers  and  various  pleas  in  abatement  a  trial 
was  had,  and  on  April  16,  1910,  a  verdict  of  guilty  was 
returned  as  to  eight  of  twelve  defendants  and  fines  aggre- 
gating $3,500  imposed.  Appealed  to  Circuit  Court  of  Ap- 
peals, argued  November,  1911,  and  awaiting  decision. 

United  States  v.  Imperial  Window  Glass  Company  et  al.  In- 
dictment found  in  western  Pennsylvania  April  7,  1910, 
charging  combination  and  conspiracy  to  enhance  the  price 
of  window  glass.  Demurrers  to  the  indictment  were  over- 
ruled, and  on  November  10,  1910,  pleas  of  nolo  contendere 
were  entered  and  fines  aggregating  $10,000  and  costs  were 
imposed. 

United  States  v.  National  Packing  Company  et  al.  Indict- 
ment returned  in  Northern  District  of  Illinois  March  2, 
1910,  charging  combination  to  restrain  trade  in  fresh  meats. 
Demurrer  to  indictment  sustained  June  23,  1910. 

United  States  v.  National  Packing  Company  et  al.  Northern 
Illinois.  Bill  in  equity  charging  combination  in  restraint 
of  trade  in  fresh  meats  and  praying  for  dissolution  filed 
March  21,  1910.  Dismissed  in  order  to  facilitate  the  prose- 
cution of  later  criminal  case. 


7. 


8. 


9. 


10. 


United  States  v.  Armour  Packing  Company  et  al  Indict- 
ment returned  at  Savannah,  Ga.,  in  April,  1910,  charging 
combination  to  control  prices  and  restrict  competition. 
Case  now  pending. 

United  States  v.  Missouri  Pacific  Railroad  Company  and 
twenty-four  other  railroads.  Petition  to  restrain  violation 
of  Sherman  law  filed  May  31, 1910,  and  temporary  restrain- 
ing order  issued  on  that  day  enjoining  advances  in  freight 
rates  in  western  trunk-line  territory,  which  would  have 
become  effective  June  1,  1910.  Thereupon  the  railroads, 
after  consultation  with  the  President,  withdrew  their  pro- 
posed advances  in  freight  rates,  and  after  the  passage  of 
the  act  of  June  18,  1910,  the  matter  was  referred  to  the 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission.  Thereafter  the  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission  enjoined  the  rate  advances 
which  the  temporary  restraining  order  obtained  by  the 
department  on  May  31,  1910,  had  prevented  from  going 
into  effect. 

United  States  v.  Southern  Wholesale  Grocers'  Association. 
Bill  in  equity  charging  combination  to  regulate  prices  of 
necessities  of  life,  filed  at  Birmingham,  Ala.,  June  9,  1910. 
An  agreement  was  reached  between  the  Government  and 
defendant's  counsel,  and  a  decree  prepared,  submitted  to, 
and  passed  by  the  court  October  17,  1911,  perpetually  re- 
straining the  association,  its  officers  and  members,  from 
doing  any  and  all  of  the  acts  complained  of. 


11. 


United  States  v.  Great  Lakes  Towing  Company  et  al.  Peti- 
tion filed  in  Northern  District  of  Ohio  on  June  19,  1910, 
against  an  alleged  combination  of  towing  facilities  on  the 
Great  Lakes.  The  taking  of  testimony  is  nearing  comple- 
tion, and  the  case  will  be  assigned  for  an  early  hearing. 


M.m» 


United  States  v.  Chicago  Butter  (&  Egg  Board.  Bill  asking 
for  dissolution,  filed  at  Chicago  June  13, 1910.  A  demurrer 
to  the  petition  was  sustained  with  leave  to  amend.  An 
amended  bill  has  been  filed  and  the  case  is  now  pending. 


United  States  v.  Frank  Hayne,  James  A.  Patten  et  al,  180  Fed., 
946.  Indictments  returned.  New  York  City,  against  alleged 
cotton-pool  conspirators,  August  4,  1910.  Demurrers  were 
sustained  as  to  certain  counts  of  indictment  and  overruled 
as  to  others,  and  the  Government  appealed  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  where  case  was  argued  November,  1911.  Awaiting 
decision. 


39 


13. 


United  States  v.  Standard  Sanitary  Manufacturing  Company 
et  al.  Petition  filed  at  Baltimore  July  22,  1910,  charging  a 
combination,  under  cover  of  a  patent  licensing  arrange- 
ment, to  restrain  competition  and  enhance  prices  of  enamel 
ware.  Four  volumes  of  testimony  was  taken,  and  case  set 
for  argument  at  Richmond  on  June  15, 16,  and  17, 1911.  In 
a  decision  rendered  October  13, 1911,  the  court  sustained  all 
the  Government's  contentions. 


14. 


United  States  v.  Louis  F.  Swift  et  al.  Indictment  returned  by 
the  grand  jury  at  Chicago,  in  September,  1910,  against  ten 
prominent  individuals  engaged  in  the  meat-packing  indus- 
try. Defendants  have  filed  numerous  pleas  in  bar,  de- 
murrers, etc.,  all  of  which  were  decided  in  favor  of  the 
Government,  and  an  early  trial  will  be  had.  Defendants 
applied  to  Circuit  Judge  Kohlsaat  for  writ  of  certiorari 
based  on  contention  that  antitrust  law  was  unconstitu- 
tional. Petition  dismissed.  Defendants  appealed  to  Su- 
preme Court  and  gave  notice  of  motion  December  4,  1911, 
for  stay  of  trial  pending  appeal.  Trial  postponed  until 
December  6,  1911. 


15. 


United  States  v.  John  Reardon  <&  Sons  Company  and  Consoli- 
dated Rendering  Co.  Indicted  jointly  by  Federal  grand 
jury  at  Boston  in  October,  1910.  Demurrer  to  indictment 
sustained  June  23,  1911. 


16. 


United  States  v.  Ferdinand  Sulzberger,  doing  business  under 
the  name  of  John  Reardon  di  Sons  Company,  and  Horatio 
W.  Heath,  of  Boston,  doing  business  as  the  Consolidated 
Rendering  Company.  Jointiy  indicted  at  Boston  in  Octo- 
ber, 1910,  for  violation  of  the  Sherman  law.  Demurrer  to 
indictment  sustained  June  23,  1911. 


17. 


United  States  v.  Horatio  W.  Heath  and  Cyrus  S.  Hapgood. 
Indictment  returned  in  October  at  Boston,  charging  viola- 
tion of  the  Sherman  law.  Demurrer  to  indictment  sus- 
tained June  23,  1911. 

(Note. — In  the  last  three  indictments,  which  were  found  simul- 
taneously, the  Government  charges  that  the  defendants  have 
attempted  to  divide  territory  between  themselves  throughout  New 
England,  so  as  to  avoid  competition  and  drive  out  competitors 
in  the  hide  and  rendering  business.) 


40 


18. 


United  States  v.  Standard  Sanitary  Manufacturing  Company 
et  al.  In  addition  to  the  above  suit  in  equity  (No.  13,  supra), 
indictments  were  returned  by  grand  jury  at  Detroit  on 
December  6,  1910,  against  the  same  corporations  and  indi- 
viduals charging  the  same  acts.  Various  demurrers  and 
dilatory  pleas  have  been  filed,  argued,  and  overruled,  and 
the  case  will  be  heard  during  the  present  fall  term  of  court. 


19. 


United  States  v.  American  Sugar  Refining  Company  et  al, 
A  suit  in  equity  was  filed  at  New  York  on  November  28, 
1910,  against  this  corporation,  its  officers  and  agents,  and 
its  owned  and  controlled  corporations,  attacking  it  as  a 
combination  in  restraint  of  trade  and  praying  for  its  disso- 
lution. Demurrers  to  bill  set  for  argument  December, 
1911. 


20. 


United  States  v.  General  Electric  Company  et  al.  Bill  in 
equity  filed  at  Cleveland,  Ohio,  on  March  3,  1911,  charging 
a  combination  in  incandescent  electric  lamps.  This  suit  is 
the  outcome  of  an  extensive  investigation  into  the  electrical 
industry.  Like  the  enameled-ware  combination,  it  is 
founded  on  a  cross-licensing  arrangement  under  patents. 

A  formal  decree  has  been  agreed  upon  between  counsel 
for  the  Government  and  the  defendant  companies,  and  was 
submitted  to  and  passed  by  the  Circuit  Court  October  12, 
1911. 


21. 


United  States  v.  Purrington  et  al.  Indictment  returned  in  the 
Northern  District  of  Illinois  September  14,  1910,  charging 
combination  to  restrain  trade  in  paving  bricks  and  paving 
blocks.    Pending. 


22. 


United  States  v.  Hamburg- Amerikanische  Packetfahrt  Actien 
Gesellschaft  and  others.  Trans-Atlantic  steamship  pool. 
Combination  of  steamship  lines  regulating  steerage  traffic 
on  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Suit  filed  January  4,  1911,  at  New 
York  City.  Demurrers  to  bill  set  for  argument  December, 
1911. 


23. 


United  States  v.  Eastern  States  Retail  Lumber  Dealers*  Asso- 
ciation. Suit  in  equity  filed  at  New  York  on  May  19,  1911, 
charging  the  Eastern  States  Lumber  Dealers'  Association, 


41 

its  officers  and  members,  with  a  conspiracy  in  restraint  of 
trade  through  the  instrumentality  of  black  lists  and  trade 
agreements. 


24. 


United  States  v.  Isaac  Whiting,  John  K.  Whiting,  Charles  H. 
Hood,  Edward  J.  Hood,  and  William  A.  Graustein.  Indict- 
ment returned  by  the  grand  jury  at  Boston,  Mass,  on  May 
26,  1911,  charging  a  combination  to  restrain  trade  in  milk 
throughout  the  New  England  States. 


25. 


United  States  v.  Isaac  Whiting,  John  K.  Whiting,  Charles  H. 
Hood,  Edward  J.  Hood,  and  William  A.  Graustein,  and 
William  A.  Hunter,  Secretary  of  Producers*  Co.  May  26, 
1911,  indictment  returned  by  the  grand  jury  at  Boston, 
Mass.,  charging  a  conspiracy  to  restrain  trade  in  milk 
throughout  the  New  England  States. 


26. 


United  States  v.  Lumber  Secretaries*  Bureau  of  Information 
et  al.  Indictment  returned  June  23,  1911,  in  the  Northern 
District  of  Illinois,  charging  that  the  secretaries  of  14  retail 
lumbermen's  associations,  covering  23  States  from  Pennsyl- 
vania to  the  Pacific  coast,  were  in  a  conspiracy  by  means  of 
a  central  controlling  bureau  to  control  the  marketing  of 
lumber  by  forcing  the  product  through  the  retailer  to  the 
consumer,  and  restraining  the  trade  of  the  manufacturer, 
wholesaler,  and  consumer,  and  eliminating  competition  for 
the  trade  of  the  consumer. 


27. 


United  States  v.  Philip  H.  W.  Smith  et  al.  Indictments  re- 
turned at  New  York  City  June  29,  1911,  against  various  in- 
dividuals, charging  violations  of  sections  1  and  2  of  the 
antitrust  law  through  the  conduct  and  operation  of  the  Un- 
derground Power  Cable  Association,  Telephone  Cable  Asso- 
ciation, Fine  Magnet  Wire  Association,  Wire  Rope  Manu- 
facturers, Horseshoe  Manufacturers'  Association,  Lead- 
encased  Rubber  Cable  Association,  and  the  Rubber-covered 
Wire  Association.  To  date  nearly  all  the  defendants  have 
appeared  and  pleaded,  and  fines  aggregating  $128,700  have 
been  imposed. 


28. 


United  States  v.  Periodical  Publishing  Company.  Bill  in 
equity  filed  in  New  York  in  June,  1911,  against  the  members 
of  the  so-called  Magazine  Trust. 


42 


29. 


30. 


United  States  v.  Jay  B.  Pearce  et  aL  Indictment  returned 
against  certain  manufacturers  and  jobbers  at  Cleveland, 
Ohio,  July  19,  1911,  for  combination  and  conspiracy  in  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  wall  paper. 


United  States  v.  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern  R.  /?., 
Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R,  /?.,  Hocking  Valley  R.  /?.,  Toledo  & 
Ohio  Central  Ry.,  Kanawha  <fc  Michigan  Ry„  Zanesville  & 
Western  R.  /?.,  and  others.  Bill  in  equity  filed  at  Columbus, 
Ohio,  August  4,  1911,  to  enjoin  combination  and  conspiracy 
in  restraint  of  trade. 


31. 


United  States  v.  Edward  E,  Hartwick  et  al  Petition  filed  at 
Detroit,  Mich.,  August  31,  1911,  alleging  conspiracy  and 
unlawful  restraint  of  trade  on  the  part  of  members  of  the 
Michigan  Retail  Lumber  Dealers'  Association,  The  Scout 
Publishing  Co.,  and  the  Lumber  Secretaries'  Bureau  of 
Information. 


32. 


33. 


United  States  v.  Standard  Wood  Company  et  al.  Petition 
filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  at  New  York  City  in  September, 
1911,  against  the  members  of  the  so-called  Kindling  Wood 
Trust,  praying  for  injunction  against  the  further  carrying 
into  effect  of  trade  agreements  and  combination  and  con- 
spiracy to  monopolize  trade. 


04. 


United  States  v.  Hunter  Milling  Company,  Blackwell  Milling 
and  Elevator  Company,  and  Frank  Foltz,  Indictment  re- 
turned by  grand  jury  to  District  Court  for  the  Western  Dis- 
trict of  Oklahoma,  September  10, 1911,  on  one  count,  charg- 
ing violation  of  section  1  of  the  Sherman  Act. 


35. 


United  States  v.  S.  W.  Winslow,  Wm.  Barbour,  E.  P.  Howe, 
Ed.  P.  Hurd,  Geo,  W,  Brown,  and  Jas,  J.  Storrow,  Two 
indictments  returned  by  the  grand  jury  at  Boston,  Mass., 
September  19,  1911,  charging  combination,  conspiracy,  and 
monopoly  in  trade  in  shoe  machinery. 


United  States  v.  The  Colorado  and  Wyoming  Lumber  Dealers' 
Association  and  The  Lumber  Secretaries'  Bureau  of  Infor- 
mation. Bill  in  equity  filed  at  Denver,  Colo.,  September 
25,  1911,  for  injunction  against  defendants  for  conspiracy 
to  restrain  trade  in  lumber  and  its  products. 


43 


36. 


United  States  v.  Willard  G,  Hollis  et  al.  Petition  filed  in 
October,  1911,  at  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  in  the  United  States  Cir- 
cuit Court,  against  the  Lumbermen's  Secretaries'  Bureau  of 
Information,  The  Lumberman  Publishing  Company,  and 
certain  individuals,  alleging  conspiracy  and  combination 
in  the  lumber  trade. 


37. 


United  States  v.  United  States  Steel  Corporation  and  others. 
Petition  fcir  injunction  and  dissolution  filed  at  Trenton, 
N.  J.,  October  27, 1911. 


O 


Date  Due 

JAerr^ 

i 

dUti 

') 

f 

' 

Wl  1»  '. 

06 

mmmmM  4k '- 

M 

' 

mfB  I  q 

■ 

9 

\ 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


0032056001 


225 

Un:55 


US  President 
Message  on  anti-tmst 


i  i ^Ihjvv"*" 


^'H .  ^J^^-^ 


J    ! 


S^l    Uo, 


v""^,; 


IWo?  0 


'994 


f\\^    o\^^y\ 


SEP  2  6  1933 


I  m 


i  !'UI 


END  OF 
TITLE 


